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Recent Development
Hong Kong: Prospects of Autonomy
under Chinese Rule after 1997
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the more notable achievements of the British empire was
the creation of a capitalist enclave at the doorstep of a Communist
Giant. In the roughly 150 years that the British have occupied Hong
Kong, they have transformed this desolate rock' off the southeastern
coast of China into "Asia's finest example of free trade and capi-
talism."12 Today, Hong Kong is the world's third largest banking
center behind New York and London3 and the world's busiest con-
tainer port.
4
1. W. BEAZER, THE COMMERCiAL FuTrEri OF HONG KONG 1 (1978) [hereinafter BEAZER].
Other than its superb, sheltered natural harbor, perhaps the best on the coast of China, Hong
Kong has virtually no natural resources. Id.
2. Current Development, Hong Kong: China's June 4 Massacre, Emigration and Capital
Flight, 3 GEo. IMMOR. L.J. 293, 293 (1989) [hereinafter Current Development].
3. King, The Trade Situation for 1997 and Beyond, 99 L.A. Daily J., Sept. 29, 1986,
at S12, col. 1.
4. Second World Container Congress Opens in Hong Kong, XtNHUA GEN. OVERSEAS
NEws SERVICE, May 13, 1989. In 1988, the Hong Kong container port handled over four
million teus (twenty-foot equivalent units), an increase of 23% over 1987. The Hong Kong
Marine Department estimates Hong Kong has replaced Rotterdam as the number one container
port in the world. Id.
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Hong Kong's jeweled economy stands to lose its luster in 1997
when China reclaims 5 sovereignty over the colony.6 Two decades of
debate between Great Britain and China culminated with the Sino-
British Joint Declaration, 7 guaranteeing Hong Kong a "high degree
of autonomy" 8 after its return. 9 Despite this guarantee, many Hong
Kong residents are concerned that China will fail to uphold the
Declaration and are divesting their resources and emigrating to safer
havens abroad.'0 China's June 4, 1989 crackdown of the student
democracy movement" at Tiananmen Square aggravates Hong Kong's
concerns that the Declaration's guarantees are empty promises. 12
Within the last decade, China has addressed some of Hong Kong's
concerns and has taken bold measures to invigorate a domestic
economy left stagnant by Mao Zedong. China has attempted to
decentralize its economy and has delineated certain regions as Special
Economic Zones 3 to attract foreign investors. These zones offer
investors free enterprise, preferential tax treatment, and cheap and
5. See, e.g., Corwin, China's Choices: The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and Its
Aftermath, 19 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 505, 510-19 (1987) [hereinafter Corwin]; P. WESLEY
SmrrH, UNEQUAL TREATY 1989-1997: CHINA, GREAT BRITAIN AND HONG KONG'S NEW TERIu-
ToRiEs, 162-63, 167-68, 185-87 (1980); Day, The Recovery of Hong Kong by the People's
Republic of China - A Fifty Year Experiment in Capitalism and Freedom, 11 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. L. 625, 632-33 (1984) [hereinafter Day] (all discussing China's longstanding
position that it never surrendered sovereignty over Hong Kong). See Mushkat, The International
Legal Status of Hong Kong Under Post-Transitional Rule, 10 Hous. J. IrNT'L L. 1, 2 (1987).
Though the British occupy Hong Kong, China has consistently maintained that Hong Kong
always has remained a Chinese territory. Id. China's position is that the acquisition of Hong
Kong was through the use of force and as such was illegal under international law. Id.
6. See Current Development, supra note 2, at 293; Day, supra note 5, at 629; Cheng,
An Economic Analysis of Capital Flight in Hong Kong, 17 INT'L L. & POL. 683 (1985)
[hereinafter Cheng].
7. Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, 3(2), Dec. 19, 1984, United
Kingdom - People's Republic of China, 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmd. 9352), reprinted in
Sino-British Agreement Determines Future of Hong Kong, 7 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMrn. L.J.
139, 142-43 (1984) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See generally Current Development, supra note 2, at 293 (discussing potential problems
of the Declaration and Hong Kong's emigration and capital flight).
11. For detailed reports concerning the Chinese student democracy movement, see Wash.
Post, May 19, 1989 - July 1, 1989; N.Y. Times, May 19, 1989 - July 1, 1989; TMIE, May 29,
1989, June 5, 1989, June 12, 1989; NEWSWEEK, May 29, 1989, June 5, 1989, June 12, 1989.
See also Current Development, supra note 2, at 300 n.66.
12. Current Development, supra note 2, at 300-01.
13. See H. HARDING, CHINA'S SEcoND REvOLUTION 164 (1987) [hereinafter HARDING].
China selected several areas along the South East coast-as "Special Economic Zones" [SEZs].
These SEZs are similar to the free export-processing zones established in Taiwan, South Korea,
and other developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s. The SEZs encourage foreign investment
in export projects by providing a modern physical infrastructure, a well-trained labor force,
preferential tax rates, exemptions, and holidays. Id.
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efficient labor. 4 These measures modernizing the mainland's economy
give Hong Kong brighter prospects of remaining autonomous and
reassure the colony that its economic and social stability should
remain undisturbed.
Part One of this article traces Hong Kong's development as an
industrial colony, comparing Hong Kong's success with China's
development during the same period. The scope of the Declaration,
some of the Declaration's potential problems, and Hong Kong's
concern over its future are addressed in Part Two. By analyzing
Hong Kong's important role in China's efforts to modernize its
economy, the last section explores the likelihood that China will
uphold the spirit of the Declaration. The paper concludes that Hong
Kong's vital role in China's economic development ensures the colony
continued autonomy and prosperity.
II. HISTORY OF HONG KONG
A. Pre-Colonial Hong Kong
. Hong Kong's history is, in large measure, a story of commercial
development.15 The territory began as a sparsely populated island,
with pirates using it mainly as an anchorage. 6 In the early 1800s,
the expanding British Empire sailed to the Far East, seeking Chinese
silk and tea. 7 The British amassed a substantial trade deficit with
China and, in an effort to balance that deficit, introduced opium to
the Chinese. 8 Futile efforts by Chinese authorities to ban the illegal
14. See infra notes 260-83 and accompanying text discussing China's Special Economic
Zones.
15. See generally HONG KONG: Tm INDUSTRIAL COLONY (K. Hopkins ed. 1971); J. ENGLAND
& J. REAR, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS & LAW IN HONG KONG (1981); A. RABusHKA, HONG KONG:
A STUDY IN ECONoMIc FREEDOM (1979) [hereinafter RABUsHLA, ECONOMIC FREEDOM]; CHINA
AND HONG KONG: Tim ECONOMic NExus (A. Youngson ed. 1983); BEAZER, supra note 1 (all
discussing Hong Kong's economic development into an industrial colony).
16. Day, supra note 5, at 629.
17. Tso, The Legal Implications of the Sino-British Treaties Regarding Hong Kong, 4
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 111, 111 (1981) [hereinafter Tso].
18. Id. See G. ENDAcoTT, A HISTORY OF HONG KONG 10 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter
ENDAcorr]. Opium was used as a medicinal drug in China since the T'ang Dynasty. But the
practice of smoking opium was a more recent phenomena, and from its introduction in the
seventeenth century, it gradually became a serious problem. The British imported opium mainly
from India and brought one million British pounds in annual revenue to the Indian Government.
Id.
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import of opium 19 ended when China seized shipments in Canton.20
China's assault on the illegal drug trade infuriated the British and
ignited the Opium War.21 The Chinese proved no match for the
British Navy. Defeated and forced into signing the Treaty of Nanking,2
China ceded Hong Kong Island to Great Britain in perpetuity. 23 Over
the next fifty years, Britain also seized Kowloon Peninsular and
Stonecutters Island, 24 and leased the New Territories for ninety-nine
years.25
B. Hong Kong: A British Entrepot
1. Pre-1900 Economy
Britain's commercial empire required a mercantile station in the
Far East to suppress robbery and piracy, guarantee contract law,
19. ENDACOTT, supra note 18, at 11. In the eighteenth century, the Chinese government
passed edicts against the smoking of opium and prohibited its importation. The Chinese took
the view that opium was harmful and should be suppressed, that foreigners coming to China
should obey Chinese laws, and that foreigners should not import drugs which destroyed men
and which hurt the Chinese economy. However, China was powerless to stop the traffic; the
local officials found it profitable to turn a blind eye on the trade. Not surprisingly, many
officials defied the opium edicts. Id.
20. Id. at 12. Lin Tse-hsu, a special Imperial Commissioner for the suppression of the
opium trade, arrived in Canton on March 10, 1839. He ordered all foreign merchants to
surrender the opium in their possession and sign a bond prohibiting future opium importation
on penalty of death. He seized several factories in Canton and other outposts and held
Europeans hostage to enforce the orders. Id.
21. Id. at 14-35. The Opium War (1839-42) arose as a result of the Chinese attempt to
control and stamp out the illicit trade in opium. Id.
22. Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, China-Great Britain, 30 B.S.P. 10, reprinted in 6
HERTsLER's Comm. TR. 221 (effective July 17, 1843).
23. Id.
24. Convention of Peking, Oct. 12, 1860, China-Great Britain, 50 B.S.P. 10, reprinted in
11 HERTsLER's Comm. TR. 112. The British negotiated a perpetual lease on these two territories.
Id.
25. Convention Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9, 1898, China-
Great Britain, 90 B.S.P. 17, reprinted in 21 HERTSLER'S CoMM. TR. 291 (effective Aug. 6,
1898). Great Britain acquired the New Territories as a Crown Lease. The British practice in
treaty ports was to compensate the Chinese for their concession by paying an annual ground
rent equivalent to the pre-existing land tax. The British Consul meanwhile bought out private
Chinese rural owners at the market price, and then granted Crown leases for 999 years at the
same ground rent that was being passed on to the Chinese government. The Chinese authorities
did not challenge this practice. However, when the lease of Wei-hai-wei was granted to Britain
in 1898, Peking protested, stating that a 999 year lease amounted to an alienation of more
than what Britain "owned." Britain heeded Peking's objection. Peking's protest may have
had some bearing on the decision to restrict Crown leases in the New Territories to the term
of Britain's tenure to 99 years. Duncanson, The Anglo-Chinese Negotiations, in HONG KONG:
A CMNESE AND INTERNATIONAL CONcERN 27 (J. Domes & Y. Shaw eds. 1988) [hereinafter
Duncanson].
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and provide safe trading conditions. 26 The British declared Hong
Kong a free port and developed the colony into an entrepot 27 for
British commerce.28 Hong Kong's early industries involved shipbuild-
ing and repairing to support the colony's seafaring trade.29 In time,
as Hong Kong became the headquarters for major British merchant
houses,30 the ancillary industries of banking, insurance, accounting,
and legal services developed. 31
2. 1900 - World War II Economy
In the early decades of the twentieth century, a substantial number
of small factories opened to meet the demands of foreign markets.
These demands arose because World War I cut off foreign markets
from overseas suppliers and the Ottawa Agreement of 193232 en-
couraged local merchants to export their goods to Commonwealth
nations. 33 The rise in exports brought a commensurate development
in Hong Kong's shipping industry.
3 4
3. Post-World War II Economy
The Japanese occupation during World War II decimated Hong
Kong's economy.35 Hong Kong's population fell from more than 1.6
26. Day, supra note 5, at 629.
27. See T. GEIGER, TA. s OF Two Crry-STATEs: THE DEVELOPmENT PROGRESS OF HONG
KONG AND SINGAPORE 7 (1973) [hereinafter GEIGER] (explaining the functions of an entrepot).
An entrepot is an economic center which is usually a port. It carries on certain essential
distribution, financial, communication, and transportation functions. The entrepot collects
goods and products from the hinterland. By combining, sorting, semi-processing and grading
these products, the entrepot is in a position to meet the requirements of foreign buyers. It
also maintains a continuous inventory of manufactured goods and raw materials ready for re-
export to the hinterland. Id.
28. BEAZER, supra note 1, at 2. Lord Pottinger, Hong Kong's first Governor, set the
standard and style for future Governors. Id. at 22. He kept the colony a free port and moved
the Superintendency of Trade from Macao to Hong Kong. Id. at 21. Lord Pottinger resisted
incursions by the army and navy as he wanted Hong Kong to be a commercial port. Id. at
35.
29. RABusmcA, EcoONac FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 16.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See GEIGER, supra note 27, at 70 (discussing the rise of Hong Kong's export industry).
The Ottawa Agreement provided preferential tariff treatment to Commonwealth countries.
Hong Kong's status as a Crown colony and the United Kingdom's long-standing ties to Hong
Kong's merchant houses entitled Hong Kong to the Commonwealth tariff preferences under
the 1932 Agreement. Id.
33. Brown, The Hong Kong Economy: Achievements and Prospects, in HONG KONG: THE
INousTmmAL COLONY I (K. Hopkins ed. 1971) [hereinafter Brown].
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1-2.
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million in mid-1939 to less than 600,000 in mid-1945. 36 Many of the
remaining inhabitants were impoverished and unskilled. 37 The entre-
preneurs, technicians, and skilled workers essential to the entrepot
economy either had died or fled the territory. 38 More significantly,
the War devalued the colony's currency, froze all bank accounts and
financial assets, and evaporated internal and external credit lines,
completely disrupting Hong Kong's network of external economic
relationships.3 9 Neither the Chinese commodities which Hong Kong
exported nor the raw materials and manufactured goods the colony
imported to re-export to China were available under the conditions
prevailing when the Japanese surrendered. 40
C. Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony
1. Hong Kong's Industrial Revolution
Immediately after World War II, local residents returned to their
entrepot industry and reestablished Hong Kong's economy.4' The
surviving colonial government improvised a functional administra-
tion,42 and the few businessmen and bankers who remained during
the War resumed their operations in makeshift quarters. 43 By promptly
restoring Hong Kong's currency and credit, the business community
enabled the colony's money supply and bank deposits to flourish."
Ample funds became available to support Hong Kong's rise as an
industrial colony.
4
While Hong Kong's economy revived itself in the post-World War
II period, China locked itself in an internal struggle between two
political factions, the Kuomintang and the Communists, which cul-
36. GEIGER, supra note 27, at 65. War deaths, mass deportations by the Japanese, and





41. GEIGER, supra note 27, at 65. Restoration of Hong Kong's entrepot activities required
reestablishing business firms and banks and their relationships with foreign suppliers and
customers. The British and Chinese-owned merchant houses, insurance companies, shipping
firms, and banks rapidly rebuilt such ties not only in East and Southeast Asia and in the
United Kingdom, but also in Australia, the United States, and Canada, whose economies were
undamaged by the war and rapidly were being reconverted to civilian production. Id. at 66.
42. Id. at 65.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 69.
45. Id.
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minated in civil war. The strife of another war in China sent refugees
into Hong Kong, doubling the colony's population.' Refugees from
Shanghai, fearing a Communist takeover, relocated their capital in
Hong Kong, where both the refugees and their money were safe.
47
2. Developing an Export Economy
Shanghai capital was used to develop Hong Kong's textile industry 48
and sparked a tremendous growth in the manufacturing sector. 49 The
colony's focus on exports largely contributed to the manufacturing
sector's phenomenal development.5" Exports of manufactures offered
more promising growth than primary products, the major export
items of Southeast Asian countries.5 1 Moreover, by specializing in
manufacturing, Hong Kong enterprises were able to overcome the
disadvantages of researching, designing, and marketing a product
overseas.5 2 Under this framework of industrialization, Hong Kong
46. Brown, supra note 33, at 2. Chinese refugees fled mainly from the Guangdong
Province and from Shanghai. From 1950 onwards, immigration from China was subject to
restrictions except for one short period. Three more surges occurred in 1951-52, 1957-58, and
in 1962, when refugees broke through the land borders. Id.
47. Id. Before the war, Shanghai was China's industrial center. Chinese entrepreneurs and
technicians were engaged mainly in the manufacture of cotton textiles and had developed all
stages of production in Shanghai. After the war, Shanghai mill owners placed large orders for
spinning, weaving, knitting, and finishing equipment in the United Kingdom and the United
States, but, owing to war-shortages in these countries, deliveries began late in 1947. By that
time, the threat of a Communist takeover of China was evident, and many Shanghai busi-
nessmen off-loaded their new machinery in Hong Kong as a precautionary measure. As
Communist armies neared Shanghai, many businessmen and technicians followed their invest-
ments to Hong Kong. With the help of bank loans, these businessmen constructed factories
to put their equipment into operation. GEIom, supra note 27, at 69. For a more extensive
analysis of the rise of capitalism in Shanghai, see P. COBLE, JR., TIM SHANGHAI CAALisTs
& TnE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT, 1927-1937 (1980).
48. BROWN, supra note 33, at 2. See GEIGER, supra note 27, at 69 (recounting the textile
industry's development in Hong Kong). In 1948, Hong Kong had 8,000 spindles; by the end
of 1951, Shanghai refugees built 210,000 spindles and 4,500 power looms and put them into
operation. A number of Shanghai businessmen started textile finishing operations and began
producing cotton undergarments, mens's shirts, children's clothes, and other apparel. Id.
49. BROWN, supra note 33, at 2.
50. Id. at 3. In recent years, 80% of all manufactures were exported. Id.
51. Owen, Economic Policy in Hong Kong, in HONG KoNG: THE INDUSTRIAL COLONY 153
(K. Hopkins ed. 1971). Demand for manufactures tends to rise at least as fast as income in
developed countries, whereas demand for primary products tends to lag behind, particularly
when primary products compete with synthetic substitutes. Id.
52. Id. at 154-55. Asian companies were often at a disadvantage in comparison to their
rivals in the more developed nations in researching, designing, and marketing a product for
overseas consumption because Asian firms were culturally unfamiliar with foreign markets. By
concentrating their efforts at manufacturing designs created by European and American firms,
Hong Kong's textile industry allayed themselves to, rather than competed with, the managerial
skills of more advanced nations and were able to develop rapidly into foreign markets. Id.
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industries expanded and established themselves in the international
market.53
3. Diversification
Hong Kong's manufacturing firms grew vertically and horizon-
tally.5 4 Textile, spinning, and weaving companies started clothing
subsidiaries; 5 enterprises assembling radios and other electronic
equipment diversified to produce a variety of transistors, diodes, and
component parts;5 6 and some companies branched off to manufacture
completely different product lines.57 This diversification contributed
to a substantial rise in industrial output. Between 1950 and 1964,
Hong Kong's industrial output rose at an unprecedented rate of 30
percent per year.58 Today, more than 50,000 manufacturing firms are
established in Hong Kong 9
4. Hong Kong's Present Economy
Hong Kong stands as one of the top 20 trading countries.60 The
colony's entrepot history has turned this island into one of the
world's more active export6' and re-export economies. 62 The colony
is a major foreign exchange63 and commodities market, 64 a commu-
53. Id.
54. GEIGER, supra note 27, at 65.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. (illustrating that a successful flashlight company started a toy factory; a
toothbrush manufacturer became the world's largest producer of medium-priced binoculars
and an exporter of low priced cameras to Japan).
58. Brown, supra note 33, at 8.
59. HONG KONG GOV'T, CENSUS & STATISTICS DEP'T, reprinted in INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT
HONG KONG: STATISTICAL TABLES 1989, at 10 (1988).
60. Prybyla, The Hong Kong Agreement and Its Impact on the World Economy, in HONG
KONG: A CIINEsE AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN 167, 170 (J. Domes & Y. Shaw eds. 1988)
[hereinafter Prybyla]. In 1982, Hong Kong exported about 99% of its manufactures. The
Colony's merchandise trade with the outside world was 182% of its Gross Domestic Product.
Its exports equaled that of China, a country with 200 times more people and 9,600 times more
land. Id.
61. See id. Hong Kong is the world's largest exporter of garments, plastic toys, and
watches. Id. Further, Hong Kong is a large exporter of a variety of other products, including:
radios, cassette recorders, computer memory systems, calculators, transistors, semi-conductors,
television games, photographic equipment, textile yarns, fabrics, electric household goods,
clothing, floor tiles, and travel goods. Id.
62. Id. Among the products Hong Kong re-exports are: textiles, clothing, precious stones,
watches, clocks, and electric machinery. Id.
63. Id.
64. Jao, Hong Kong's Future as a Free Market Economy, in HONG KONO: A CHINESE
AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN 205 (J. Domes & Y. Shaw eds. 1988) [hereinafter Jao, Free
Market Economy]. Hong Kong is Asia's leading center and one of the world's larger gold
markets. Id. Hong Kong is the world's third largest gold and diamond trading center. Id.
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nications center serving Southeast Asia,6 and an important financial
center. 6 Because of Hong Kong's central location and state of the
art facilities, 67 a large number of multinational enterprises have
established their headquarters in the colony.68 Both businessmen and
visitors are attracted to this crown colony.6 9
III. CINA'S ECONoMIc HISTORY-
A COMPARISON WITH HONG KONG
China's history traces back 4,000 years and recounts the world's
oldest continuing civilization.7 0 To appreciate China's past and to
predict its future, one must be mindful of the Confucian canons
upon which the Chinese structured their political, economic, and
social systems. Confucianism prescribed a social hierarchy based on
family relations.1 Its teachings, however, spread far beyond the
family and permeated the country's legal,72 political,7 3 and educational
institutions. 74 Confucianism also molded the Chinese perception of
the world order, placing China at the center of the universe.7 - Locked
65. Prybyla, supra note 60, at 170.
66. Id.
67. See Fishburne, Hong Kong 1997: Practical Aspects, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 43,
44 (1988) [hereinafter Fishburne]. Many office buildings exist and more are being built.
Acceptable expatriate housing is in place. World class hotels are available for business travellers.
Communications, data processing, and related equipment and services from across the world
are available in Hong Kong. Id.
68. Prybyla, supra note 60, at 171. These organizations include 800 American corporations
with offices, factories, or joint ventures within the region. Id.
69. Id. Hong Kong is a spectacular tourist city. In 1984, Hong Kong attracted 3.2 million
visitors from around the world. 20% were from the United States and an additional 20%
from Japan. Id.
70. J. MELBY, THE MANDATE OF HEAVEN 3 (1968) [hereinafter MELBY]. Archeological
studies may date China's origins back even earlier. Id.
71. J. SHERIDAN, CHINA IN DISINTEGRATION: THE REPUBLICAN ERA IN CHINESE HISTORY,
1912-1949, at 16 (1975). Central to Confucian thought is the patriarchal family system in
which status was determined by age, sex, and generation; elders dominated younger, and male
dominated female. Filial piety was the chief virtue, but all other obligations of superiority and
subordination inherent in the family hierarchy-such as those between older and younger
brothers and between generations-were also strictly observed. Id.
72. See id. Chinese law, for example, reinforced the Confucian tenets of family relation-
ships and discriminated according to Confucian notions of age, generation, and sex. Id.
73. See H. QUIGLEY, CINA'S PoLncs IN PERSPECTIVE 4 (1962). Confucianism justified
the patriarchy between the emperor and the subject. The country may be analogized to a large
family-with the emperor as the father and the Chinese people as his children. In this regard,
all subjects had a filial duty to serve the emperor. Id.
74. See MELBY, supra note 70, at 4. The Chinese educational system centered around the
Confucian books. Chinese scholars studied years to memorize these books before taking the
Imperial Exams to qualify for civil service. Id.
75. The Chinese name for China is "Zhong Guo," literally translated as "Middle
Kingdom".
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in a sense of self-assured cultural superiority,7 6 the Chinese were
content to live in isolation, believing that the outside world had
nothing to offer them.77 By emphasizing self-reliance, Confucianism
bred discontentment over foreign intrusion78 and exacted heavy tolls
upon those reasserting the country's autonomy.
79
A. China's Traditional Economy
China's economic development traced a path opposite that of Hong
Kong. The Chinese emphasized subsistence and grounded their econ-
omy in agriculture. 0 Human effort, animal power, and natural
fertilizers cultivated the farmlands.8 Although floods, droughts, and
plagues frequently devastated harvests, 82 China's traditional farmers
fed a Chinese population that doubled in size between 1750 and
1850, reaching 400 million people.83
76. MELBY, supra note 70, at 3. Although China isolated itself from the world during
much of its recorded history, at no time was China's interior in close contact with any other
culture even remotely equal to its own. The occasional invasions by nomads from the north
and west whose military strength forced their way into the interior invariably were absorbed
by the Chinese culture and vanished with little trace. To the Chinese, this proved their innate
superiority to all other peoples, a belief strongly ingrained even today. Id.
77. Recent Development, Current Developments in the People's Republic of China: Has
China Changed?, 1 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 505, 506 (1988) [hereinafter Recent Development]. See
R. NORTH, CHINESE CommomNsM 10 (1966). China's isolationism is often illustrated by a tale
wherein a Chinese emperor told King George's envoy "as your Ambassador can see for himself,
we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your
countries's manufactures." Id.
78. MErBY, supra note 70, at 5. The Confucian Doctrine emphasized a system of ordered
harmony. The Emperor ruled by the Mandate of Heaven and had certain rights and respon-
sibilities. Each person also had complementary rights and responsibilities. Ordered harmony
depended upon acceptance of one's role in the social order; so long as each citizen performed
properly, the Emperor retained the Mandate. When any person failed, for whatever reason,
the Emperor lost the Mandate, which passed to whomever gave evidence of being able to
perform a monarch's role. Id. Foreigners, who coerced China into ceding portions of the
Middle Kingdom in order to conduct trade, understood and accepted little of China's cultural
practices. By failing to observe their position in the social order, foreigners disrupted China's
ordered harmony that invariably led a monarch to his downfall. Id.
79. See, e.g., J. EsnPuicK, THE ORonqs OF THE BOXER UpIsINo (1987) (discussing the
Boxer Movement of the late nineteenth century); S. PEPPER, CxVIi WAR IN CHINA: THE
POLITICAL STRucGGa, 1945-1949 (1978) (recounting the Chinese Civil War). See infra notes 88-
93 and accompanying text (discussing the Great Leap Forward); see also infra notes 94-98 and
accompanying text (discussing the Cultural Revolution).
80. HARDInG, supra note 13, at 13.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id. By expanding the arable farmlands, adding more water, improving the strains of
seeds, and growing two or three crops a year, China's rural economy fed a population that
doubled in size. But China's agriculture encountered problems of diminishing marginal returns
from the traditional technologies employed. New arable land became increasingly scarce, and
further inputs of available seed, fertilizer, and labor could not keep up with the demands of
the growing population. As per capita incomes fell, poverty and despair in the countryside
became widespread. Discontentment fueled the peasant uprisings of the nineteenth century. Id.
at 14.
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B. China's Rise to Industrialization
By the mid-nineteenth century, China's traditionalism was helpless
against the militarily superior Western nations which forced China
to open its economy to those seeking silk, tea, inks, brushes, and
porcelain.8 China's defeat in the Opium War opened "treaty ports"
where foreigners could conduct trade. The humiliation of conceding
land to foreign nations convinced some Chinese of the need to
industrialize the country to meet the military challenge from the
West."5
By 1949, China had developed a small industrial base concentrated
in Manchuria and Shanghai. The bulk of China's industries involved
light manufactures such as textiles, cigarettes, matches, and other
consumer goods . 6 Although confiscatory taxation, foreign invasion,
civil war, and inflation intermittently disrupted China's developing
economy, China's industrial base provided a rich foundation of raw
materials and energy supplies for continued development under the
Communist regime.
87
When Mao Zedong and the Communist Party gained control of
the Chinese government in 1949, they implemented an economic
policy emphasizing large-scale industry. 8 The Party selectively incor-
porated the Marxist economic model 9 and borrowed heavily from
the Soviet Union to industrialize China2 °O When the Soviets suspended
technical aid to China because of ideological differences, 91 the Chinese
84. Id. China's unchallenged prestige created an unawareness of the changing relative
status of the modem challenge until it appeared at China's doorstep. THE MODERNIZATION OF
CHINA 514 (G. Rozman ed. 1981).
85. HARDING, supra note 13, at 14. China's defeat in the Opium Wars of 1840-42 and
1856-60 convinced Chinese officials and merchants to absorb foreign technology and initiate
a program of industrialization. Id.
86. Id. Foreign owned plants produced one-third of this output. Id.
87. Id.
88. A. RABusHKA, THE NEW CINA: ComARATnE ECONOmic DEVELOPMENT IN MAINLAND
CHINA, TAIwAN, AND HONG KONG 55 (1987) [hereinafter RA usHKCA, Tim NEw CmNA].
89. Recent Development, supra note 77, at 508. Mao Zedong molded the Marxist economic
and political theory into a uniquely Chinese economic system to benefit from certain aspects
of the Soviet model and to avoid the problems inhering from the Soviet experience. Id.
90. RABusHKA, Tim NEw CHINA, supra note 88, at 58. By 1955, 156 Soviet-assisted major
projects had become the backbone of modern Chinese industry. Together with 143 ancillary
projects, these heavy industrial projects absorbed over one-half of all industrial development
during the first Five Year Plan. The Soviets supplied between 50% and 70% of all equipment
used in these projects. Id.
91. See J. CHEsNEAUX, CHINA: THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, 1949-1976, at 101 (1977). In the
summer of 1960, the Soviet Union announced that it was withdrawing its technicians and
ending its assistance to China. This withdrawal occured because of the growing ideological
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turned inward and looked to self-sufficiency as the foundation of
their economy. 92 Mao Zedong directed China towards the Great Leap
Forward 93 and the Cultural Revolution, 94 isolating the country from
the world. 95 Although these events laid the Chinese economy to
waste, an overview of China's industrial development between 1952
and 1978 suggest the Chinese largely met their industrial goals. During
those years, the heavy industrial output index increased twenty-
eightfold, 96 in comparison to a sixteenfold increase in the gross
industrial output index. 97 Heavy industry also occupied a greater
proportionate share of total Chinese output, rising from 30 percent
in 1949 to 72 percent in 1978.98
C. China's Centrally Planned Economy
Following the Soviet economic model, Mao's China transferred
the means of production from private to public hands. 99 The Chinese
differences between the two countries; the Chinese denounced the Soviets as revisionists and
the Soviets criticized China's Great Leap Forward and people's communes. Additionally, the
Soviets failed to support China in two serious international disputes, the Taiwan Straits Affair
and the conflict with India after the Tibetan rebellion. The two countries' relationship further
deteriorated until the alliance was finally broken. Id.
92. RABusHKA, THE NEw CHINA, supra note 88, at 58.
93. See Day, supra note 5, at 640 (discussing the Great Leap Forward, 1958-62). During
these years, Mao decentralized industry and placed exacting demands on peasants to support
China's modernization. Id. The Great Leap Forward produced major economic dislocations,
including three years of severe recession during 1959-61, and famine conditions in which 30
million people starved to death. RABUsHA, THE NEW CHINA, supra note 88, at 34.
94. See HAIu'iN, supra note 13, at 12 (examining China's internal struggles from 1966-
76, called the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution). The Cultural Revolution forced the
Chinese to adhere to the ideological purity of Marxist-Leninist Communism and to denounce
all bourgeois and intelligentsia. The Revolution threw out all Western influences and denounced
Western philosophies. During the Revolution, the Party abolished the rule of law, except those
edicts the Party issued. EAST AsLN Exac. REP., Apr. 15, 1987, at 7.
95. RAnusmcK, TE NEw CHNA, supra note 88, at 58.
96. Id. at 55. The composition of industrial output changed in favor of such heavy
industries as engineering and petroleum, which replaced textiles and food processing as the
largest contributors to the value of output. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Total industrial employment increased from 12.5 million in 1952 to 50 million in
1978; in state-owned industrial enterprises employment rose sixfold from 5.1 million to 30.4
million. In constant inflation-adjusted prices, output per person in state-owned industrial
enterprises nearly tripled. The ratio of capital employed per worker in state-owned enterprises
rose fivefold, from 2,102 yuan per worker to 10,464 yuan. Overall, the estimated injections
of new capital contributed about three-quarters, and additional labor about one-quarter, to
the growth of industrial output. Id.
99. Id. at 57. State commercial enterprises took over wholesale and retail distribution
from private firms. In early 1952, the government fiercely attacked domestic capitalists, accusing
them of tax evasion, bribery, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and
stealing state information for private speculation. Within four years, the state replaced the
private sector and directly produced 68% of output. Private commerce declined from 85% of
retail sales in 1950 to less than three percent in 1957. Id.
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government distributed goods and allocated the country's investment
and labor resources.'0° The government dictated procurement quotas
and set rigid prices on all major goods.' °0 This bureaucratic system
created a number of institutional deficiencies, including: (1) inability
to respond to consumer demands, producing surpluses of unwanted
goods and shortages of highly desired goods; 10 2 (2) difficulties in
collecting and coordinating required information; 10 3 (3) an absence
of labor markets;e 4 (4) low incentives; 05 (5) lack of entrepreneur-
ship;'06 (6) misallocation of resources; 0 7 and (7) political interference
in economic tasks. 10 8
D. Industrial Reforms
Upon Mao's death in 1976, a more pragmatic leadership took
control of the Chinese Communist Party.'09 The inefficiencies of the
100. See Guoguang & Ruisan, Restructuring of the Economy, in CHNA'S SOCIALIST MOD-
ERNIZATIoN 87, 89 (Y. Guangyuan ed. 1984), stating that all enterprises had to "seek approval
for doing everything, big and small, from the higher departments which were divorced from
the front line of production, had no responsibility for the results of the operations of the
enterprises and often gave impractical and disconnected mandatory directives." Id.
101. HARDING, supra note 13, at 15. The Chinese system identified a level of production
rather than a certain quality of product or an efficient level of production. Id.
102. See RABusHc.A, TnE NEw CHnNA, supra note 88, at 30. The planners' unwillingness
to free prices created a limited private economy. Id.
103. See id. at 32. Information requirements in a planned economy are daunting. Produc-
tion, collection, analysis, and transmission of economic statistics accompany a huge statistical,
ministerial, and planning apparatus. Millions of prices must be set and adjusted. These
adjustments are often late, infrequent, or unrelated to the realities of production. Individuals
face incentives to misreport statistics to claim above-target production, causing planners to set.
even higher targets in subsequent years. Id.
104. See id. at 30.
105. See id. at 33. The state assigned workers to enterprises regardless of whether they
desired the post or had suitable skills. More desirable jobs often were assigned as compensation
for favors or as a form of bribery or corruption. Once assigned, workers could not be
discharged for incompetence and received equal pay no matter how hard they worked. Bonuses,
overtime, and piecework were curtailed or abolished. Id.
106. See id. Factory managers faced many disincentives in streamlining efficiency, pro-
moting industrial safety, and improving product quality. The Chinese rejected as "elitist"
sound business practices such as labor discipline, prevention of absenteeism, attention to
quality, and industrial safety. No managerial efforts were rewarded with higher salaries. The
State further required all enterprises to surrender their receipts, limiting managerial choice. Id.
107. See RABustKA, THE NEw CHINA, supra note 88, at 33. Factory managers had no
incentive to economize on the use of capital because planners provided them on a cost-free
basis. Because of this, factory managers requested more capital than could be used efficiently,
in the event that fewer capital inputs were provided than requested. Id.
108. See id. at 30.
109. HARDINo, supra note 13, at 40. When Mao died, three factions vied for control over
the Chinese Government. One group, Jiang Qing, fought to preserve the spirit of the Cultural
Revolution; another, led by Hua Guofeng, wished to restore the political and economic
institutions of the 1950s while still remaining loyal to Mao; the third, Deng Xiaoping's
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Soviet economic model required readjustments of the economy and
decentralized administrative control." 0 The State permitted the de-
velopment of locally owned collective enterprises and individual en-
terprises with private capital,"' reduced the number of cadres in
factory leadership positions, " 2 expanded enterprise autonomy," 3 elim-
inated losses at state-operated enterprises," 4 and eliminated working
capital as grants from the state budget."' These changes in the
Chinese economy allowed experimental enterprises to increase their
output fifteen percent from 1978 to 1979 and increase general profits
thirty-three percent. 16 By 1985, athough state ownership and planning
still dominated the economy, private ownership and economic activity
followers, argued to modernize China's economy. Within a month of Mao's death, Hua
Guofeng ousted the leftists and took control of the Chinese Government. But Hua faced many
hurdles in reviving a sluggish economy decimated by the Cultural Revolution and failed to
alleviate the confidence crisis plaguing urban China. These failures shifted Chinese politics to
the rightist reformers, led by Deng Xiaoping. Id.
110. RAnusHcA, Tim NEW CHNA, supra note 88, at 78. The Third Plenum of the l1th
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party called for "readjusting, restructuring,
consolidating, and improving the economy." Id. at 79. Since then, China has undertaken a
variety of experiments and reforms in industrial enterprises. The innovations started on a small
scale, primarily in Sichuan Province, and spread throughout the country. These reforms
included campaigns to eliminate losses in state-owned enterprises, substitution of income taxes
for the remission of profits to the state, and expanding local managerial decision-making
authority. Id.
111. Id. at 81. Between 1978 and 1980, the number of private enterprises increased from
150,000 to 400,000. Other new economic institutions included joint state-private enterprises
allowing shareholders to receive dividends from profits and producer's cooperatives where
private parties pooled their capital to establish an enterprise. Id.
112. Id. The State authorized enterprises to train and test for enterprise managers. Id.
113. Id. Experimental enterprises were allowed: (1) to produce and market additional
merchandise in response to market demand after meeting a government specified output target;
(2) to sell its above-target output and any new products it developed; (3) to retain three to
five percent of the profits made according to the state plan, as well as an additional 15% to
20% of profits from above-plan sales; (4) to retain 60% of depreciation funds for technical
renovation and innovation; (5) to pay its workers and staff a production bonus of 17% of
standard total wages; (6) to appoint middle management without interference from higher state
bodies; and (7) to be charged at zero interest on working capital for quota sales and at low
rates for above-quota production, but at high rates to finance excess inventory. Id. at 79.
114. Id. at 81. This allowed state enterprises to fire managers who failed to meet production
targets and substitute income taxes for remission of profit to the state. Id. The Head of the
State Economic Commission announced the cancellation of subsidies to unprofitable state
enterprises. To ensure factory efficiency, the State adopted measures to crack the "iron rice
bowl"-a practice that guaranteed employment regardless of the employee's productivity. The
State authorized managers to sign contracts with new workers linking pay with performance,
and to dismiss unproductive staff. Wren, China Seeks to Cut Redundant Labor, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 2, 1983, at A3, col. 1.
115. RAnusmcA, Tim NEw CHMNA, supra note 88, at 81.
116. Id. at 79 (stating that the figures for non-reform enterprises were three and seven
percent). Based upon the encouraging performances of these experimental enterprises, the State
Council authorized an additional 4,000 enterprises in 1980. By June 1980, 6,600 experimental
enterprises existed, nearly 16 of the total enterprises. Id. This growing fraction produced 60%/0
of the total value of output and earned 70% of the total profits. Id.
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occupied a greater proportion of the Chinese economy." 7
E. The Results of China's Industrial Reforms
The new economic policies shift China's economy away from
central planning towards a greater reliance upon market forces. These
policies do not signal a new wave of capitalism in China; they reflect
the compromise that regulation through market forces is compatible
with socialist public ownership." 8 Unfortunately, these reforms fall
far short of their announcements. 1 9 China remains far from a truly
competitive, private-enterprise economy; managers at state-owned
enterprises do not enjoy the autonomy they were promised. The
Government still restricts free entry into and exit out of markets,
free purchasing and marketing of all commodities, and flexibility to
vary prices. 20 Despite their shortcomings, China's reforms liberated
factory managers from a regime of mandatory central planning and
permitted a system of non-binding instructive planning to prevail.
2'
IV. REASSERTION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER HONG KONG
Because of Hong Kong's and China's divergent economic practices,
Hong Kong residents and business community grow more anxious
over the colony's future as July 1, 1997 approaches.'2 For awhile,
many in Hong Kong were hoping China would extend the British
117. Id. In 1985, state-owned enterprises accounted for 70% of gross urban industrial
output, collectively owned enterprises accounted for about 28%, and private enterprises
accounted for less than one percent. Id. Though still a small fraction of the Chinese economy,
private businesses produced a growing proportion of the total yuan value of retail sales,
jumping from 210 million yuan to 66.1 billion yuan between 1978-85. Id.
118. Id. at 82. To assist the process of socialist modernization, Chinese officials recently
encouraged full enterprise autonomy, including: incentives to increase labor productivity,
reduced planning, a rational price system, reform of the tax, financial, and banking systems,
competition, consumer sovereignty in the marketplace, the rule of law, eliminating bureaucracy
and overstaffing, wage differentials to reflect differences in skill, acceptance of unequal
distribution of income, the expansion of the place of the individual economy, contracting out
the work of state-owned enterprises to individuals and small-scale collectives, opening of China
to foreign investment, and replacement of old party comrades with young professionals. Id.
at 83.
119. Id. at 84. Although the reform measures significantly altered the structure of industrial
operations, industrial efficiency lagged. Between 1978-82, for example, a 37% increase in fixed
assets, an 18% increase in working capital, and a 16% increase in workers and employees
were required to expand output by 26%. The productivity of fixed and working capital
continued their downward trend, although labor productivity showed a modest gain. Id.
120. RABUSHKA, THE NEw CHINA, supra note 88, at 83.
121. Id.
122. See infra notes 179-230 and accompanying text concerning Hong Kong's fears over
reunification with China and the colony's response, including capital flight and emigration.
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lease on the New Territories for another ninety-nine years, 23 but that
dream faded when China demanded the return of the New Territo-
ries. 124
A. The Chinese Position Regarding Hong Kong
From the Chinese historical perspective, the British extorted Hong
Kong Island and Kowloon through the "Unequal Treaties,"' 25 when
China was incapable of defending itself. 126 Believing itself coerced
into these agreements, China denounces their validity. 27 Although
the British have de facto control over Hong Kong, 28 the Chinese
reject any British claim of permanent possession, let alone a claim
of sovereignty, over the colony. 129 Moreover, the Chinese refuse to
surrender any portion of their country, especially if its society and
culture still recognizably belongs to Chinese civilization. 30
123. See Editorial, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 5, 1984, at 112. No matter how remote the possibility,
some writers suggested that China sign a new lease agreement, or simply ignore the expiration
date, on the theory that the agreement is void anyway and conditions are not yet ripe for
resolution. Either course would maintain a situation more profitable to China than to Great
Britain. Id.
124. Park, British Pressured Over Hong Kong, Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 10, 1983, at
4E, col. 1. China asserted that if no agreement was reached regarding the future of the New
Territories upon the expiration of the lease, China would retake control over the region. Id.
125. The "Unequal Treaties" refer to the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, the Convention of
Peking in 1860, and other treaties that forced China to cede Chinese territory to foreign
nations.
126. GEIGER, supra note 27, at 133. See also supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text
(discussing Treaty of Nanking and Convention of Peking).
127. See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text (examining grounds when a treaty is
invalid under Chinese law).
128. Although the Chinese do not recognize the British occupation in Hong Kong as
lawful, by entering into the Declaration, China is conceding that Britain has de facto control
over the colony.
129. Mushkat, The Transition from British to Chinese Rule in Hong Kong: A Discussion
of Salient International Legal Issues, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoV'Y 171, 178 (1986) [hereinafter
Mushkat, Salient Legal Issues]. China has made many statements rejecting Britain's claim of
sovereignty over Hong Kong. For example, the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, in
an address to the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Independence for Colonial
Countries, sought to remove Hong Kong from the list of territories failing within the
Committee's terms of reference, stating:
Hong Kong ... [is] part of Chinese territory occupied by the British . . . authorities.
The settlement of the questionf of Hong Kong ... is entirely within China's
sovereign right and does not fall under the ordinary category of colonial territo-
ies.... With regard to the question[] of Hong Kong ... the Chinese Government
has consistently held that [it] should be settled in an appropriate way when the
conditions are ripe. The United Nations has no right to discuss the[] question[].
1 PEOPLE'S CHINA & INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 384 (J. Cohen & H. Chiu
eds. 1974).
130. GEIGER, supra note 27, at 133.
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B. The British Position Regarding Hong Kong
The United Kingdom regards both the Treaty of Nanking and the
Convention of Peking as valid agreements. 31 As such, Kowloon,
Stonecutter's Island, and Hong Kong Island belong to the United
Kingdom in perpetuity. 32 However, the British have agreed to return
Hong Kong in its entirety when the lease on the New Territories
expires 133At the end of the lease, Hong Kong will lose ninety-two
percent of its territory, 34 and with the loss of territory, a vital section
of the economy. 35 To ensure Hong Kong's thriving economy, the
British had virtually no choice but to negotiate a return of the entire
colony. 136
131. Duncanson, supra note 25, at 30. The British contend that although coerced treaties
have been condemned since the conclusion of the Covenant of the League of Nations, earlier
treaties are not thereby invalidated; nearly all treaties result from hard bargaining and contain
provisions the signatories would like to avoid; and no case claiming the invalidity of the most
notoriously unequal treaty of modem times, the Treaty of Versailles, has ever been brought
to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Id.
132. GEIGER, supra note 27, at 133.
133. Day, supra note 5, at 634. By the late 1970s, Hong Kong's investors and residents
already were expressing concern over the colony's future. China stood firm on its position
that if no agreement was reached, it would retake the New Territories at the expiration of the
lease in 1997. With the New Territories severed, the ceded colony would be cut off from its
supply line and no longer would be viable. Since no practical way to maintain a divided Hong
Kong existed, Britain negotiated an international agreement to return the entire colony. Id.
134. See Castle, The Reversion of Hong Kong to China: Legal and Practical Questions,
21 WiLLAmErm L. REv. 327, 333 (1985).
135. Tso, supra note 17, at 134. Hong Kong's Kai Tak airport and a large portion of its
harbor facilities are located in the New Territories. Id.
136. Chiu, Introduction, in THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG 8 (H. Chiu, Y. Jao & Y. Wu
eds. 1987). In 1983, China announced its plans for the future of Hong Kong if no agreement
with the United Kingdom was reached over the issue of sovereignty over Hong Kong. Faced
with a dilemma of either accepting an agreement with China on the latter's terms or having
no agreement at all, the United Kingdom acquiesced to China's demands for sovereignty.
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher informed Premier Zhao that the United Kingdom would
sever all its ties with Hong Kong. Id.
Originally, the British negotiated to exchange sovereignty over Hong Kong for continued
administrative control. But the People's Republic of China rejected this proposal on three
grounds: (1) by accepting the British proposal, China would implicitly be accepting the validity
of the Treaty of Nanking and the Convention of Peking, which is contrary to China's
longstanding position; id. (2) assuming that China accepted continued British control over
Hong Kong, China could not justify a demand to reunify with Taiwan. Taiwan adamantly
refuses to reunify. If China were to leave Taiwan alone for another 50 years, China may have
to use its military to achieve its unification goals. Ironically, if no Taiwan problem existed,
China might tolerate the British proposal because at any time China could remove the British
and restore Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong; id. (3) since Mao's death, no Chinese leader
has been in a position to concede Chinese sovereignty for fear that a rival faction might gain
an upper hand in the ongoing power struggle in China's domestic politics. However, any leader
who recovers sovereignty over Hong Kong would have his prestige greatly enhanced. Id. at 9.
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V. THE SINo-BRITIsH JOINT DECLARATION
Although the Chinese and British governments are concerned with
a smooth transition when China reasserts sovereignty over Hong
Kong, 37 great skepticism surrounds this "marriage of the century." '38
With a view to securing Hong Kong's prosperity after its return, 39
the two governments negotiated the Sino-British Joint Declaration.14
0
The Declaration recognizes the difficulties in assimilating two vastly
different cultures' 4' and declares Hong Kong a Special Adminis*trative
Region 42 when the colony is returned to China. 143 The region, al-
though subject to the authority of the Central People's Government
of the People's Republic of China, will enjoy a high degree of
autonomy in all matters,' 44 except foreign and defense affairs.
41




The Hong Kong Government will be comprised of local residents.
47
The Central People's Government will appoint the Chief Executive
137. Both Governments will establish a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group to effectively
implement the Joint Declaration. Annex II, Sino-British Joint Liaison Group, at 3, reprinted
in 7 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 139, 158 (1984). The Joint Liaison will (a) conduct
consultations on the implementation of the Joint Declaration; (b) discuss matters relating to
the smooth transfer of the government in 1997; and (c) exchange information and conduct
consultations on subjects that both governments may agree upon. Id.
138. Kristof, Hong Kong, Wary of China, Sees Its Middle Class Fleeing, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 9, 1987, at Al, col. I [hereinafter Kristofl. China is not only one of the more regulated
societies in the world, the country is also enormous and economically sluggish. In sharp
contrast, Hong Kong is a monument to laissez-faire capitalism; the island is a tiny, pulsating
territory that dominates southern China with its commercial activities. Id.
139. See Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at Introduction (reflecting China's and Great
Britain's desire to preserve Hong Kong's flourishing and dynamic society and economy).
140. Id. The Declaration states, "the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
... and the Government of the People's Republic of China have ... agreed that a proper
negotiated settlement of the question of Hong Kong ... is conducive to the maintenance of
the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong .... Id.
141. This is the probable meaning behind the Joint Declaration, "... Upholding national
unity and territorial integrity and taking account of the history of Hong Kong and its
realities .... " Id. at 3(1).
142. Id. Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution states, "The state may establish special
administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative
regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of
the specific conditions." Constitution of the People's Republic of China, art. 31, adopted by
the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, Dec. 4, 1982, reprinted and translated
in CHINA LAws FOR FoanoN BusI'Ess 4-500 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987).
143. Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at 1.
144. Id. at 3(2).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 3(3). The judicial power includes that of final adjudication. Id.
.147. Id. at 3(4).
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from a list of candidates received in local elections or through local
consultation. 148 The Chief Executive shall then nominate all principal
officials whom the Central People's Government will later appoint
into office.
149
The Hong Kong legislature will also consist of locally elected
representatives. 50 The legislature will be authorized to enact laws and
report them to the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress for the record.'-' These laws will be valid if they conform
with the provisions of the draft Basic Law, the future Constitution
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.1
5 2
B. Economic Autonomy
In order to maintain Hong Kong's prosperity and stability, the
Declaration preserves Hong Kong's current economic system. 53 The
Declaration provides that socialist policies will not be practiced in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 5 4 Further, China
promises not to interfere with Hong Kong's capitalist structure for
fifty years.
5
Under the Declaration, Hong Kong will decide its economic and
trade policies 56 and will retain its status as a free port and separate
customs territory. 5 7 China promises not to disturb the free movement
of goods and capital to and from Hong Kong158 and authorizes Hong
Kong to maintain and develop its own economic and trade relations
with other states and regions. 159 Using the name "Hong Kong,
China,' '6 Hong Kong shall participate in all relevant international
organizations and international trade agreements.' 6' Further, Hong
148. Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at 3(4).
149. Id.
150. Annex I, Elaboration by the Government of the People's Republic of China of its
Basic Policies Regarding Hong Kong, reprinted in 7 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 139, 146
(1984) [hereinafter Annex I].
151. Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at (4).
152. Annex I, supra note 150.
153. Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at 3(5).
154. Annex I, supra note 150.
155. Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at 3(12).
156. Annex I, supra note 150.
157. Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at 3(6).
158. Annex I, supra note 150.
159. Id.
160. See Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at 3(10).
161. Annex I, supra note 150. Hong Kong shall be permitted to participate in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and arrangements regarding the international trade in textiles.
Id.
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Kong may issue its own certificates of origin for locally manufactured
products.
1 62
Hong Kong will enjoy independent finances and shall not declare
its revenues to the Central People's Government. 63 The Chinese
Government agrees not to levy taxes on the territory. 64 Hong Kong
will remain an international financial center 65 and its markets for
foreign exchange, gold, securities, and futures will continue undis-
turbed.1e The Declaration also secures the free flow of capital 67 and
the continued circulation and free convertibility of the Hong Kong
dollar. 68 Hong Kong shall handle its own financial matters, 69 in-
cluding disposing of its financial resources 70 and drawing up its
budgets and final accounts.' 7' The only procedural imposition on the
Hong Kong Government is that it must report its budgets and final
accounts to the Central People's Government for the record. 72
C. Cultural Autonomy
The Declaration promises to preserve Hong Kong's social structure,
retaining the region's lifestyle. 73 The Declaration guarantees that the
rights and freedoms long enjoyed by Hong Kong residents will be
legally protected. 74 Hong Kong will decide its own policies regarding
culture, education, science, and technology. 7 Local students will
enjoy the freedom to choose their fields of education and to pursue
education abroad. 76 Hong Kong school districts may solicit staff and
162. Id. Hong Kong is authorized to issue certificates of origin in accordance with the
prevailing rules of origin. Id.
163. Id.
164. Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at 3(8).








173. Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at 3(5).
174. Id. These rights include: personal rights, free speech, free press, the right of assembly,
association, travel, movement, correspondence, the right to strike, the choice of occupation,
academic research, religious freedom, right to own private property and private enterprises,
and the right of inheritance. Id.
175. Annex I, supra note 150. Annex I also provides that Hong Kong may select its own
policies regarding the educational system and its administration, the language of instruction,
the allocation of funds, the examination system, the system of academic awards, and the
recognition of educational and technological qualifications. Id.
176. Id.
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teaching materials for educational purposes from outside the terri-
tory.177 Additionally, the Chinese Government promises not to inter-
fere with Hong Kong's religious and community organizations.
78
VI. HONG KoNG's FEARS AND CONCERNS OVER RETURNING TO
CINA
Although the Declaration promises Hong Kong a high degree of
autonomy, China's history of political instability and abrupt changes
in China's social climate demonstrate that promises may not neces-
sarily lead to future compliance. 79 Many Hong Kong residents and
business communities are concerned over Hong Kong's future and
have unsettling questions about the Declaration.
A. Fear of Political Intrusion
1. Local Representation
Hong Kong residents are normally complacent over the political
process.8 0 The Tiananmen Square massacre stunned the colony and
gave rise to calls for greater representation in the colony's future
legislature.' Under the current version of the draft Basic Law, only
one-third of the Hong Kong legislature will be publicly elected. 182
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Chiu, The International Law of Recovery and Multi-System Nations - With Special
Reference to the China (Mainland - Taiwan) Case, I CE sE Y.B. INr'L L. & Axr. 1, 11
(1981). In 1951, China promised not to "alter the existing political systems" nor "to change
the established status, functions, and powers" of the Tibetan government. Id. Despite this
agreement, in 1959 China invaded Tibet, forcibly seizing it and killing thousands. Id.
180. Stormont, China Severely Limits Elections in Post-1997 Hong Kong, THE REUTER
LiE. REP., Dec. 15, 1989 [hereinafter Stormont]. As residents of the world's most capitalist
city, Hong Kong citizens have long been viewed as being concerned only with making money.
Loyalties to firms are less important than salary and fringe benefits, making workers respond
quickly and rationally to alternative market opportunities. RAnusHcA, ECONOMIC FREEDOM,
supra note 15, at 75.
181. Stormont, supra note 180.
182. As of the time of this publication, the most recent version of the draft Basic Law,
February 1990, provides that only 20 of 60 members in the legislative council will be
democratically elected in 1997. Hurd, Accused of Cave-in on Hong Kong, N.Y. Times, Feb.
17, 1990 (NEXIS, INTL library).
Thousands of angry students boycotted classes, held sit-ins, and street demonstrations
denouncing Britain's "selling-out" to China and protesting the Chinese-imposed decision to
limit democratic elections to the territory's legislature. Braude, Students Condemn Hong Kong
Deal, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1990 (NEXIS, INTL library).
Although the draft Basic Law remains tentative until ratification, significant changes in the
draft are unlikely before the National People's Congress officially adopts the Basic Law. Id.
The tentative date for ratification of the Basic Law as of the time of publication is April 4,
1990. Telephone interview with spokesperson for the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office,
in San Francisco (Mar. 27, 1990).
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Many fear that without a majority in the legislature, the voices of
the Hong Kong representatives will effectively be muffled; if Chinese
loyalists constitute a majority of the legislature, they could enact any
law they wished and greatly interfere with Hong Kong's legislative
autonomy. 183
Furthermore, China is vested with the power to appoint the Chief
Executive of Hong Kong. 8 4 This ensures that no person will hold
the executive office unless the person represents and promotes Chinese
interests. Since the Chief Executive is authorized to appoint the
secretarial staff,185 all persons holding significant posts in Hong
Kong's future government will be persons furthering Chinese goals.186
Through the Executive Staff, China could have complete control
over Hong Kong's Government.
One writer criticizes Hong Kong's proposed future political struc-
ture as too conservative and authoritarian. 187 Under this view, Hong
Kong's system of representative government is a "democratic
mirage"' 8 because representatives are elected into bodies having no
real power. 189 The Government's alleged misrepresentations have baited
the Hong Kong people into a democratic trap-positive power lies
not in the legislative council, but in the civil service and secretarial
posts over which China may have complete control.'10
2. Conflict with the National Constitution
Of great concern to Hong Kong is the ability of the colony's
future legislature to effectively enact its own laws. The Chinese
183. See Stormont, supra note 180. As the current version of the draft Basic Law stands,
the Hong Kong public elects an insufficient number of representatives to the Legislative Council
to constitute a ruling majority. Id.
184. Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at 3(4).
185. See id.
186. Lee, Hong Kong: The Human Rights Dimension, in THE FuTuRE OF HoNo KoNao:
TowAR 1997 AND BEYOND 115, 131-32 (H. Chiu, Y. Jao & Y. Wu eds. 1987) [hereinafter
Lee]. Deng Xiaoping made it clear to two delegations from Hong Kong that the region will
be run by local Chinese "patriots" after 1997. Deng further explained, "[we] don't require
them all to favor China's socialist system, but only ask them to love the motherland and
Hong Kong.... Hong Kong must be administered by Hong Kong residents with patriotic
Chinese as the main body." Id.
187. See Lockwood, Colony Safeguards Spurned by China, Daily Telegraph, Dec. 16,
1989, at 7.
188. See Walden, Hong Kong Chases a Democratic Mirage, Asian Wall St. J., Mar. 7,
1985, at 12.
189. Id.
190. Id. The secretarial posts carry significant responsibilities in Hong Kong's government.
They oversee the entire legislative process for Hong Kong, carry out legislative enactments,
and decide many issues affecting Hong Kong's internal and external affairs. Id.
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Constitution entitles the State Council' 9' to "alter or annul inappro-
priate decisions and orders issued by local organs of state adminis-
trations at different levels.' ' 92 Since the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region is a local administrative organ, the State
Council expressly is authorized to annul, or alter, any of Hong
Kong's legislative enactments that conflict with the National Consti-
tution.
B. Fear of Economic Intrusion
Hong Kong's laissez-faire economy relies upon market forces to
allocate its resources efficiently. This capitalist approach stands in
sharp contrast to the traditional practice of central planning in
mainland China. 91 Many investors are skeptical that the Chinese
Government can successfully operate a free enterprise and trade
territory with only minimal interference. 94 Further, many Hong Kong
residents fear living under an economic system from which they
escaped four decades ago. 195 China has given no assurances to Hong
Kong that its future will be prosperous. Instead, the Chinese have
openly criticized Hong Kong and sternly warned the colony not to
interfere with Chinese affairs. One commentary, reportedly written
by an official of the Chinese Government, conditions Hong Kong's
continuing capitalist system upon local support of the Chinese Gov-
ernment, stating, "[the Central People's Government] will not allow
191. See Constitution of the People's Republic of China, art. 85, adopted by the Fifth
Session of the Fifth National Peoples Congress, Dec. 4, 1982, reprinted and translated in
CHINA LAWS FORFOREION Busnuass 4-500 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987). "The State Council,
that is, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, is the executive
body of the [National People's Congress,] the highest organ of state power; it is the highest
organ of state administration." Id.
192. Id. at art. 67. This may render the Executive Organ in Hong Kong vulnerable to
administrative interference from structurally higher levels of government within the People's
Republic of China. See Mushkat, Salient Legal Issues, supra note 129, at 181.
193. RABusmHA, Tim Naw CmNA, supra note 88, at 162.
194. The Future of Hong Kong, Bus. WREK, Mar. 15, 1984, at 50, 52; See A Whiff of
Panic in Hong Kong, Bus. WEK, Nov. 15, 1982, at 172, 176. The Chinese Government has
traditionally exercised strict control over every aspect of the country's economy. Id. The
capitalist system, which the Joint Declaration promises to keep in Hong Kong for 50 years,
leaves the people alone. Prybyla, supra note 60, at 177. Socialism-Stalinist, Maoist, Dengist-
is in varying degrees, the antithesis of laissez-faire capitalism. Id. The nature of the socialist
system is one that is constitutionally incapable of non-interference. Despite the many reforms
over the last decade, the Chinese socialist economy still rests upon philosophical premises that
are fundamentally at odds with the premises, qualities, and temperments of a free market
economy. Id.
195. Kristof, supra note 138, at Al, col. 1.
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people to use Hong Kong as a base for subverting the Central
People's Government."'
' 96
C. Fear of Cultural Intrusion
Hong Kong's population is predominantly Chinese. 97 Although
many of its citizens observe Chinese customs, Hong Kong is culturally
distinct from the mainland; the colony's greater exposure to foreign-
ers has "westernized" its residents in many ways. 98 Hong Kong's
culture combines hard work with the freedom to enjoy leisure activ-
ities. 99 Its culture has a unity that Beijing may not understand,
perhaps not even accept. 2°° Many in Hong Kong wonder how long
the Chinese Government will tolerate the territory's freedoms or how
China will keep the ideological "HongKongization ' 20 1 from spreading
into the mainland. These fundamental questions reflect Hong Kong's
fear that the freedoms it now possesses will be taken away long
before the fifty year guarantee expires.
20 2
Hong Kong residents also are concerned about their human rights
after the Colony reverts to China. China's respect for human rights,
although improved substantially since the Maoist era, is still signifi-
196. See China Warns Hong Kong Residents, Wash. Post, July 22, 1989, at A18, col. 1,
stating " ... [n]ot engaging in activities to overthrow [the Chinese Government] is a pre-
condition for allowing Hong Kong to retain its capitalist system." Id.
197. Lohr, Few in Hong Kong Seek Democracy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1982, at A3, col. 1.
98% of Hong Kong's population is Chinese. Id.
198. See generally Baker, Life in the Cities: The Emergence of Hong Kong Man, 95 CHINA
Q. 469, 478-79 (1983) (describing life in Hong Kong). Hong Kong Man is highly competitive,
tough for survival, quick-thinking and flexible. He wears Western clothes, speaks English or
expects his children to do so, drinks Western alcohol, has sophisticated tastes, and expects life
to provide a constant stream of excitement and new opportunities. He is not British nor
Western; he is merely Westernized. Yet Hong Kong Man is not Chinese in the same way as
his brother is in the People's Republic of China. Hong Kong Man is sui generis and Hong
Kong's future is more difficult to resolve because of him. Id.
199. Hicks, Hong Kong on the Eve of Communist Rule, in THE FuTrRE OF HONG KoGo:
TOwARD 1997 AND BEYOND 27 (H. Chiu, Y. Jao & Y. Wu eds. 1987) [hereinafter Hicks].
Horse racing, Macao casinos, gambling, lotteries, nightclubs, and other recreational activities
give Hong Kong residents a zest for life to balance the colony's demanding work ethic. Id.
200. See id.
201. See HARDING, supra note 13, at 82 (discussing China's fears over Hong Kong's
growing influence). China is concerned that its citizens will start to believe that anything
foreign is superior to its Chinese counterpart. The Government complains that this "national
nihilism" will undermine the traditional virtues of diligence, frugality, and patriotism in
Chinese culture. China sees the materialism and selfishness of the West as the root of crime,
corruption, and inflation and believes that Western ideas and capitalism excessively influence
literature, art, music, and film. These are the feared effects of "HongKongization." Id.
202. Chiu, Introduction, in THE FuTurRE OF HONG KONG: TowARD 1997 AND BEYOND 18
(H. Chiu, Y. Jao & Y. Wu eds. 1987).
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cantly below Western standards .203 Although the Declaration states
that "the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force,"0
these covenants are not incorporated into Hong Kong's laws and
residents whose rights have been violated have no remedy in court. 25
Many Hong Kong residents criticize the Declaration for falling to
mention basic freedoms: the right to life, the right to a fair trial,
and the protection against torture and cruel and unusual punish-
ment0.2
203. Although China has liberalized its economic, social, and cultural spheres, its human
rights record, particularly in regard to political dissidents, is still unsatisfactory. See J. COPPER,
F. MICHL, & Y. Wu, HumAN RIGHTS IN PosT-MAo CHINA (1985) (discussing China's position
regarding human rights); Lee, supra note 186, at 115-37 (questioning China's ability to respect
Hong Kong's human rights). To Beijing, the "slogan" of human rights that includes freedom
and equality is of Western origin. Id. at 129-30. Under the Chinese view, "human rights" is
a bourgeoisie term used to oppose feudalism. Id. at 130. Since the bourgeoisie has corrupted
"human rights", scientific Marxism must replace it. Id. at 130-31. As one article explains:
History shows ... [that] the slogan of human rights has played an important role
in breaking through the shackles of feudal ideology, encouraging people to rise to
fight and propel the bourgeois revolution ... the slogan of human rights is after
all a slogan of the bourgeoisie. Although it includes all nominal universal principles
of man, in reality, it is nothing but the right of the bourgeoisie. In [a] capitalist
society, the capitalists occupy the means of production and monopolize the ideology
in society and [the] propaganda machine .... It is not strange that the slogan of
human rights was later turned into a tool for the imperialists and bourgeoisie to
attack the proletariat and socialism....
Unlike the slogan of human rights which reflects bourgeois ideas such as freedom
and equality, marxism puts forward the scientific viewpoint of freedom and equal-
ity .... Establishment of the proletarian democratic dictatorship, abolition of private
property, elimination of classes and eventual realization of Communism are the
definitive Marxist statement on the equality and freedom of man.
Commentary, Heilongiiang Ribao (Harbin), May 20, 1981, at 3, in FoR. BROADCASTING INFo.
SER V., CHINA, June 17, 1981, at K17. See also Lee, supra note 186, at 130 (discussing how
China evades Western criticism of its human rights record). By rejecting the Western notion
of "human rights" and following the Marxist line, Beijing put itself outside the Western
concept of human rights and outside of Western criticism. Given this position, Beijing's record
for human rights is, not surprisingly, poor. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text
(referring to China's recent crackdown and swift execution of numerous pro-democracy
protestors as underscoring the country's abysmal standard of human rights).
204. Annex I, supra note 150.
205. Lau, Colony's Government Proposes Bill of Rights: Confidence Building, FAR E.
EcoN. REv., Oct. 26, 1989, at 19. In attempting to restore local confidence, the Hong Kong
Government announced plans to enact a bill of rights for the territory. The bill of rights
would incorporate all "relevant" provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Although this bill would be supreme over all other laws in Hong Kong, the fact
remains that it would not supercede the Basic Law as prescribed by the Joint Declaration. Id.
206. Lau, Basic Problems of Law, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Aug. 11, 1988, at 18, 19. Article
39 of the draft Basic Law proposes that the rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents can
be restricted "for the maintenance of national security, public order, public safety, public
health, public morals and for safeguarding the rights and freedoms of other persons." Id.
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VII. HONG KONG'S RESPONSE
Hong Kong's fear over reunification with China has shattered the
residents' and business community's confidence in the future. 07 Skep-
tical that the Declaration's guarantees will be upheld, many Hong
Kong residents have voted with their feet, causing capital flight"0 8
and "brain drain.
' '209
A. Capital Flight from Hong Kong
Following the British Jardine Matheson conglomerate's 210 decision
to relocate its headquarters to Bermuda, 21' many Hong Kong busi-
nesses are expected to take measures to secure their financial positions
in the event that Hong Kong's economic conditions deteriorate.
212
Hong Kong businesses have undertaken various strategies of "pre-
cautionary diversification" in order to protect themselves: (1) re-
moving the registered head office from Hong Kong to a foreign
country, usually one that is a tax haven;213 (2) establishing a branch
office, or acquiring a foreign firm wholly or in part; 2 4 (3) selling
207. Prybyla, supra note 60, at 169-70. Hong Kong's economic performance is the product
of an unfettered exercise of choice by private economic agents. This freedom, and the pressures
that go with it, allows Hong Kong to respond quickly to changing conditions in the world
market. Id. at 169. This freedom also greatly contributes to the nervousness, speculativeness,
and volatility in Hong Kong's economy. The fascination with risk, speculative activity, the
cycles of exuberance and anxiety, impatience, and frayed nerves are the facts of life of any
free market. If Hong Kong is, as some people have suggested, money, and money is confidence,
then the slightest change in the delicate pattern of factual information, rumor, and interpretation
on which confidence rests will have instant and large effects on decisions to consume, save,
invest, remain, or leave for more congenial environments. Like its owners, money is extremely
mobile. Id. at 170.
208. See Current Development, supra note 2, at 305. See also Cheng, supra note 6, at 683
(examining capital flight from Hong Kong). Investors are concerned over Hong Kong's
economic future. Those concerns have contributed to capital flight from Hong Kong. As 1997
approaches, many investors are expected to leave the colony and re-invest their money in the
United States and other countries. Id. at 684.
209. Current Development, supra note 2, at 305. "Brain drain" describes the emigration
of a country's educated. Id.
210. Jardine Matheson is the oldest British trading company in Hong Kong. In 1859, a
representative of the Jardine Matheson arrived in Shanghai seeking Chinese silk.
211. See Wu & Jao, Economic Consequences of 1997, 20 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 17,
32 (1987) [hereinafter Wu & Jao] (citing Jardine's Holding Company Quits Hong Kong, S.
China Morning Post, (Hong Kong), Mar. 29, 1984). See also Will Other Companies Follow
Jardine Out of Town?, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 16, 1984, at 62.
212. See Wu & Jao, supra note 211, at 32 (citing Jardine's Holding Company Quits Hong
Kong, S. China Morning Post, (Hong Kong), Mar. 29, 1984); Will Other Companies Follow
Jardine Out of Town?, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 16, 1984, at 62.
213. See Wu & Jao, supra note 211, at 32.
214. See id.
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the firm's equity to a foreign firm or forming a joint venture with
a foreign firm;215 and (4) transferring liquid assets abroad, leaving in
Hong Kong sufficient resources only for transactional purposes. 216
These precautionary strategies do not imply outright withdrawal from
Hong Kong, 217 but the businesses adopting the strategies further
undermine the already questionable level of confidence Hong Kong
residents have in their future.
218
B. Emigration from Hong Kong
Instead of remaining in Hong Kong and relying upon Chinese
promises of future autonomy, many Hong Kong residents have
emigrated to foreign shores, 2 9 and a growing number are expected
to leave. 20 The projected number of Hong Kong residents expected
to emigrate in 1990 is 55,000, up thirty-one percent from 42,000 in
1989. 2' The escalating emigration rate greatly concerns Hong Kong's
215. See id.
216. Id.
217. See Jao, Hong Kong's Economic Prospects After the Sino-British Agreement: A
Preliminary Assessment, in THE FurruRE oF HONo KONo: TowARDs 1997 AND BEYoND 75 (H.
Chiu, Y. Jao & Y. Wu eds. 1987) [hereinafter Jao, Hong Kong's Economic Prospects]. Unless
conditions become intolerable, few firms will abandon Hong Kong even after 1997. The
attractions of Hong Kong's business climate and the lure of China's enormous market are
considerable. As an example, Jardine Matheson's decision to move its legal domicile to
Bermuda in 1984 has not resulted in the winding down of its operations. On the contrary, the
company is expanding its business with China. Id.
218. Matthews, Flight of Capital Raises Fears in Hong Kong: Officials See Threat to
Economic, Political Autonomy Under Chinese Rule, Wash. Post, July 14, 1989, at G1. The
most prominent case of "precautionary diversification" is the Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HKSB), a British Bank founded and incorporated in Hong Kong in
1865. The HKSB is Hong Kong's de facto central bank; HKSB cannot move its head office
elsewhere without causing an immediate financial panic. This caution, however, has not
prevented HKSB from diversifying. In 1980, HKSB completed the acquisition of Marine
Midland Bank of the United States, a merger that catapulted HKSB's global ranking to the
seventeenth largest commercial bank in the world. In 1981, HKSB unsuccessfully tried to take
over the Royal Bank of Scotland, but the British Monopoly and Merger Commission thwarted
its attempt. Jao, Hong Kong's Economic Prospects, supra note 217, at 75.
219. See Kristoff, supra note 138, at Al, col. 1. With less than 10 years of British control
remaining, growing numbers of Hong Kong's population are bidding farewell to this "fragrant
harbor," the literal translation of Hong Kong. Many Hong Kong citizens do not trust China's
promises and are leaving to bear cold Canadian winters and other hardships still only dimly
understood. Id.
220. Jones, Exodus from Hong Kong Gathers Steam Since Beijing Crackdown on Protests,
Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Sept. 18, 1989, at 11 [hereinafter Jones, Exodus from Hong Kong].
The Hong Kong government says that the effect of China's June 4, 1989, crackdown on the
student democracy movement will not be seen in 1989s final emigration numbers because of
the time it takes for applications to be filed, processed, and acted upon. Nevertheless, many
private analysts are skeptical that fewer people are leaving in 1989 than in previous years. Id.
221. Id. This is almost three times the average rate of emigration from Hong Kong during
the early 1980s. Id.
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government and local businesses because of the resulting brain drain
of young middle managers and professionals.m2 A recent study shows
a disproportionately large number of emigrants in the twenty-five to
forty-four age group.m But of graver concern is the fact that those
leaving are generally better educated than is the population as a
whole. This disparity in educational levels is evidenced dramatically
by the fact that eighteen percent of the emigrants in 1987 held college
degrees in contrast to the overall population average of three and a
half percent. 2 4 Hong Kong's brain drain is further exacerbated by
favorable immigration laws in foreign countries designed to benefit
their domestic economies.2 5
The anxiety which Hong Kong citizens feel is reflected further in
the increased number of applications for Certificates of No Criminal
Convictions. These Certificates are issued by the police department
and typically are required for visa applications .2 6 In 1985, 23,063
persons applied for these Certificates.227 In 1986, applications rose
fifty-four percent to 35,605;221 within the next year, they rose another
fifty percent to 53,471.229 Although as a government spokesperson
has explained, "[the] whole idea is to keep Hong Kong people here
and keep Hong Kong successful, not to have them go and live on
222. See id. (discussing the Hong Kong Government's concern over the colony's brain
drain).
223. Id. A large percentage of Hong Kong's emigrants who are of working age come from
the colony's middle management ranks. Of the 30,000 emigrants in 1987, some 7,400 or 25%
of the total were in the "professional, technical, administrative and managerial" categories of
the work force. This stands in contrast to about 11% of the colony's work force who belong
in the same category. Id.
224. Id.
225. Weaver, Immigration for Investors: A Comparative Analysis of U.S., Canadian and
Australian Policies, 7 B.C. Irr'L & Comp. L. Rlv. 113, 114 (1984) [hereinafter Weaver].
Canada, the United States, and Australia are the three popular destinations where Hong Kong
residents are emigrating. Kristof, supra note 138, at Al, col. 1. Canada and Australia have
investment visas available to lure Hong Kong's citizens. Weaver, supra, at 114. These laws
generally require an investment of a certain amount of money in a domestic enterprise that
will create jobs for local citizens. Id. at 124. Although the United States generally has restricted
its immigration policies to that of family reunification, recently it has increased the quota
permitted for Hong Kong relatives to immigrate. Id. at 114. Additionally, the United States
Senate has approved a measure permitting investment visas for anyone investing $1,000,000
into a new commercial enterprise employing at least 10 U.S. citizens. S. 358, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989).
226. See Current Development, supra note 2, at 304. The Certificate of No Criminal
Conviction serves little purpose other than to support visa applications. 45 countries require
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the other side of the world,"2' 0 the Hong Kong government continues
to be unsuccessful in allaying the fears and curtailing the exodus of
its citizens.
VIII. WILL CHINA COMPLY WITH THE JOINT DECLARATION?
Hong Kong's economic miracle is attributable to an industrious
labor force, a legal structure based upon British common law, 231
economic freedom, and political and social stability. 2 2 Capital flight
and emigration of Hong Kong's professionals impair the colony's
competitiveness and are deleterious to the colony's economy. If the
colony is to prosper after 1997, China must comply with the spirit
of the Declaration and keep Hong Kong autonomous.
A. International Law
1. Is China Bound to the Declaration?
The Declaration provides that the Chinese and British Governments
"agree to implement" the terms of the agreement and its three
annexes233 and that the Declaration shall be "equally binding ' 23 4 on
both countries. Further, both governments are content with the scope
230. See Jones, Exodus from Hong Kong, supra note 220, at 11 (quoting Mike Rowse,
spokesman for the Hong Kong government).
231. Jao, Free Market Economy, supra note 64, at 207. Hong Kong has a well-established
legal system, which effectively protects personal liberty and other human rights as well as
private property and contracts. Id. Recent studies in economics emphasize the importance of
law for the efficient allocation of resources and the effective preservation of incentives to all
economic agents, especially entrepreneurs. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. &
ECON. 1 (1960). Moreover, Hong Kong's legal system is based on English common law and
equity, and is widely understood and appreciated by commercial nations, particularly English-
speaking countries sharing the same traditions with whom Hong Kong maintains close economic
and commercial ties. Jao, Free Market Economy, supra note 64, at 207.
232. Jao, Free Market Economy, supra note 64, at 206. Since 1945, Hong Kong has
enjoyed a high degree of political and social stability. While not directly responsible to the
general public, the colony's paternalistic government, led by British nationals, has been
responsive to local demands. This system of implicit "rule by consent" has secured a high
degree of political stability. Hong Kong also has attracted a huge influx of refugees who are
victims of repression and tyranny. These immigrants share a distaste for political turmoil and
value Hong Kong as a safe haven. Their "refugee mentality" is conducive to the colony's
social stability. Id.
233. Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at 7.
234. Id. at 8. The Joint Declaration became binding upon ratification on May 27, 1985.
Harding, The Future of Hong Kong, 12 Cmv'A Bus. REv. 31, 33 (Sept.-Oct. 1985) [hereinafter
Harding, The Future of Hong Kong].
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 3
of the agreement, 23s suggesting the spirit of the Declaration will be
upheld. Under these circumstances, one may not reasonably conclude
that the two countries would negotiate a Declaration only to delib-
erately repudiate it.236 Ultimately, however, China's obligations de-
pend less upon the Declaration's substantive provisions under





2. Substance over Form
The Chinese signed approximately 2000 international agreements
between 1949 and 1976238 and view these and other international
treaties as important sources of international law. 239 Although the
form of these agreements have differed, China's willingness to view
them as sources of international law is not affected.m As one Chinese
theorist noted, "although in practice various names are used for
international treaties, such as treaty, agreement, protocol, exchange
of notes, and declaration, these names do not have legal signifi-
cance."4,
235. The late Hong Kong Governor Sir Edward Youde and British Foreign Secretary Sir
Geoffrey Howe have repeatedly stressed that the agreement is binding. Ching, Hong Kong
Clears the First Hurdle, Asian Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1984, at 6, col. 5. Prime Minister Zhao
added, "Since both China and Britain, as well as the Hong Kong people, consider the
Declaration excellent, we [China] have no reason not to implement it." Wren, China Vows to
Honor Hong Kong Pact, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1984, at A3, col. 4.
236. Jao, Free Market Economy, supra note 64, at 211.
237. See Corwin, supra note 5, at 510.
238. G. SCOTT, CHINESE TREAaS 61 (1975) [hereinafter SCOTT].
239. Corwin, supra note 5, at 510.
240. Id. at 511.
241. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(l)(a), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 680-81 (1969). "A treaty is an international agreement
concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied
in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation." Id. (emphasis added). Under Chinese law, as long as a written statement is
endorsed by two or more governments and does not merely reflect general principles but
agreements on specific questions that incorporate definite rules of conduct, that statement will
be legally binding on the parties (no reference made to form). Cohen, Legal Implications of
Recognition of the People's Republic of China, 72 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 240, 242 (1978).
The Chinese tend to look to the consensual intent rather than the specific modality or form
of an agreement as the source of its binding force. H. HsruNo, LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA'S
FOREIGN RELATONS 223 (1972).
Cf. Wang, Kuo-cm MAo-I T'iAO-YurH Ho HsIEH-To [INTERNATIONAL TRADE TREATIms AND
AGREEMENTS] (1958), portions translated in 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA & INT'L L. 1162, 1162-63 (1974)
(suggesting that "treaty" should be used for important international documents-those relating
to political or economic concerns). An agreement usually refers to special or short-term issues.
Id. However, the authority required to conclude a treaty is usually greater than the authority
required to conclude an agreement. Id.
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Instead, the Chinese place more value upon an international agree-
ment's substantive terms than upon its label. This emphasis stems
from 150 years of humiliation attributed to the "Unequal Treaties
' '242
which forced China to concede territory to militarily superior nations.243
Under the Chinese view, whether an international agreement is valid
depends upon the agreement's substantive provisions. 2" A treaty is
unequal if: (1) the contracting parties are of unequal bargaining
strength at the time the agreement is consummated; 245 (2) the treaty's
terms are based upon "unequal" or "non-reciprocal" considera-
tions;24 or (3) the treaty encroaches upon a nation's sovereignty. 247
Agreements falling within any of the three categories are void and
can be unilaterally abrogated at any time.
24
8
242. The "Unequal Treaties" refer to the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, the Convention of
Peking in 1860, and other treaties that forced China to cede territory to foreign nations.
243. ScoTT, supra note 238, at 17-28. During the nineteenth century, facing military pressure
from England, France, and Russia, the Chinese acquiesced to the Treaties of Nanking, the
Bogue, Wanghia and Whampoa, which imposed significant infringements upon Chinese sov-
ereignty. In 1858, after the Arrow War, the English and the French continued to exercise
"gunboat diplomacy" to force further concessions from China. During this war, Russia took
advantage of China's weak position to encroach further upon Chinese territory. The Chinese
and Russians eventually concluded the Treaty of Aigun, which reflected these adjusted borders.
Id. at 23.
244. Corwin, supra note 5, at 511. The idea of substantive equality fits into a broader
scheme of ideal conditions for international accords. These conditions are set forth in the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: (I) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and
sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal
affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; (5) peaceful co-existence. ScoTT, supra note 238, at
92.
245. See ScoTT, supra note 238, at 92.
246. See id. at 93.
247. See Mushkat, Salient Legal Issues, supra note 129, at 176. The Chinese believe that
sovereignty is the most important principle of international law and the most valuable
characteristic of the state. They consistently dismiss any attempt to subvert, dilute, or transfer
sovereignty as contrary to international law. Id. The People's Republic of China is extremely
sensitive of encroachments upon another nation's sovereignty, and opposes the United Nations'
efforts to actively engage in world affairs as a peace-keeping force. In particular, the Chinese
reject "the use of any third party judicial body such as the International Court of Justice."
Id. China claims that these interventions violate Article 2, 7 of the United Nations Charter,
which prohibits the United Nations from intervening in domestic affairs. ScoTT, supra note
238, at 50.
248. Unequal treaties became a significant issue in international law with the territorial
concessions of the later nineteenth century. China challenged the validity of such treaties,
arguing that unequal treaties could be abolished under the theory of rebus sic stantibus. See
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1139 (5th ed. 1979) (defining this as a condition attaching to all
treaties that the treaty shall cease when facts available to the parties at the time of entray
have substantially changed). In effect, China was no longer the weak victim of imperialist
powers. The unequal treaties, a product of duress, could be abolished. However, "[Tireaties
of a slave nature can be unilaterally abolished regardless of whether there has been a vital
change of circumstances." H. Cmu, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AN TH LAW OF
TREATrs 103 (1972).
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3. Practicality over Substance
Because nations rarely enter into agreements with equal bargaining
strength and a treaty's substantive provisions seldom confer equal
benefits to both sides, almost all international agreements would be
void under Chinese law. 249 In practice, however, China's compliance
with international agreements depends more upon the treaty's use-
fulness to Chinese goals than upon strict notions of international
law. 50 One commentator observed, "[if an international agreement]
is useful to [China], to socialist enterprise, or to the peace of the
world, we will use it ... [if not, China] will not use it and should
create a new instrument to replace it."21 China's history of invali-
dating international agreements supports this observation. In 1928,
the Nationalist Government unilaterally annulled all prior agreements
conflicting with China's opposition to the Unequal Treaties and
China's insistence of sovereignty.5 2 However, and more pertinently,
although China always has regarded the British occupation in Hong
Kong as an infringement on Chinese sovereignty, the Government
has never taken affirmative measures to remove the British.2 3 Hong
Kong's commercial development makes the colony an important
trading partner for the Chinese, a relationship that the Chinese wisely
did not wish to disrupt. 2 4 Consequently, notwithstanding the De-
claration's provisions binding the Chinese to the agreement, the
Declaration must be viewed in light of Hong Kong's influence on
Chinese efforts to modernize their economy.
249. Corwin, supra note 5, at 513. Under the Unequal Treaties doctrine, no degree of
inequality is necessary to invalidate an agreement. This being the case, the doctrine serves to
invalidate almost all international agreements. Id.
250. Comment, Legal Aspects of the Sino-British Draft Agreement on the Future of Hong
Kong, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 167, 185 n.168 (1985).
251. Chiu, The Nature of International Law and the Problem of a Universal System, in
LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: COMMUNIST CHINA & SELECTED PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 3 (1972) (quoting Ch'en, Refuting the Absurd Theory Concerning International Law,
People's Daily, Sept. 18, 1957).
252. SCOTT, supra note 238, at 87-88.
253. Duncanson, Hong Kong as a Crown Colony, in HONG KONG: A CHINESE AND
INTERNATIONAL CONCERN 9-10 (J. Domes & Y. Shaw eds. 1988). The British officials feared
in 1945 that Chiang Kai-Shek might insist on the return of Hong Kong after Japan's surrender.
Stalin taunted Churchill with that prospect at Yalta and Roosevelt encouraged Chiang to raise
the issue, but Chiang made no such demand. Hong Kong remains as the only foreign enclave
in China to survive the peaceable moves for retrocession between the World Wars and the
Communist takeover, which removed all the other enclaves. China was aware that Hong Kong
differed from other settlements and concessions-that the self-esteem lost was more than offset
by the wealth gained. Id.
254. See generally Jao, Hong Kong's Economic Prospects, supra note 217, at 76-79
(discussing Hong Kong and China's growing economic interdependence).
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IX. CHINA'S MODIERNIZATION PROGRAM
Although Mao successfully rid China of many historical inequi-
ties,2 5 his leadership became increasingly irrational in his later years.
6
The Chinese faithfully followed him into social and economic reforms
of apocalyptic proportions. Mao's policies created economic stagna-
tion, and when Mao died, the country sought radical reforms to
break the cycle of wallowing.5 7 The reform-minded Chinese Govern-
ment instituted the "Four Modernizations" 5 to invigorate China's
economy. Steering away from the socialist economic model, the
Government decentralized the economy to allow greater market reg-
ulation of domestically produced goods. The Government also "opened
the door" to foreign investment, increasing China's interaction in
the international economy. 9
A. Special Economic Zones
Of all the reforms undertaken in the post-Mao period, the most
widely publicized is the creation of Special Economic Zones [SEZs]. 260
255. See HARDNG, supra note 13, at 11-12. Mao Zedong raised the stature of the working
class, launched the country on a path of industrialization, and ended foreign privilege in
China. Id.
256. Sep supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Great Leap Forward and
the Cultural Revolution).
257. HAt NG, supra note 13, at 12.
258. See Nishitateno, China's Special Economic Zones: Experimental Units for Economic
Reform, 32 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 175, 175 (1983) [hereinafter Nishitateno]. The "Four
Modernizations" is an effort to help China catch up with the developed Western nations by
the end of this century in four fields: agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national
defense. Through this new effort, the communist leaders seek to reform the political and
policy making system, revitalize the educational system, increase China's role in the global
economy, and alter the nation's demographic trajectory. Lampton, The Implementation Prob-
lem in Post-Mao China, in PoLIcY IMPLEMENTATION IN POST-MAO CHINA 3 (D. Lampton ed.
1987).
259. HARDING, supra note 13, at 131. Although Mao's economic policy emphasized self-
reliance, China was not as autarkic as observers commonly perceived. Certainly the Cultural
Revolution seriously impaired China's economic ties with trading partners, with exports
declining to less than three percent of the national output in 1970. But after this low point,
Beijing dramatically increased the import of industrial supplies and foreign technology, and
expanded the export of agricultural products, raw materials, and manufactured goods. By
1975, China's total foreign trade increased more than 250%, reaching nearly $15 billion, and
exports rose to five percent of national output, the highest level in China's history. Hua
Guofeng's leadership brought another surge in trade, surpassing $20 billion in 1978-a 40%
increase from 1975. Id.
260. An important function of the SEZs is to serve as a mechanism for the introduction,
study, and absorption of technology in a wider range of industries than in most export-
processing zones. They are laboratories in which new management techniques and economic
policies can be tested before being adopted in the rest of China; they are filters which screen
out those aspects of foreign technology and culture that are not considered appropriate for
Chinese needs; they also are lubricants that facilitate China's reunification with Hong Kong,
Macao, and Taiwan. Id. at 164.
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In 1980, China delineated certain areas within Shenzhen, Zhuhai,
and Shantou in Guangdong Province and Xiamen in Fujian Province
as SEZs261 to develop external economic cooperation and technical
exchanges and to promote the socialist modernization program. 262 In
an SEZ, enterprises are treated more favorably than in other areas
regarding matters such as the tax rate and the scope of the enterprise's
operation.23 The SEZs link China to Hong Kong as well as to the
world. 264 Each SEZ seeks to attract "all items of industry, agriculture,
livestock breeding, fish breeding and poultry farming, tourism, hous-
ing and construction, research and manufacture involving high tech-
nologies and techniques that [encourage] international economic
cooperation and technical exchanges .... -265 By guaranteeing that
261. See Pow & Moser, Law and Investment in China's Special Investment Areas, in
FOREIGN TRADE, INVsTmENT, AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 201 (M.
Moser ed. 1987) [hereinafter Pow & Moser]. A number of considerations prompted the nation's
planners in choosing the locations for China's SEZs. The most important of these are
geographical factors:
(1) The zones are situated along the coast to facilitate the importation of raw
materials and the exportation of finished products to the international market;
(2) Guangdong and Fujian provinces are the ancestral homes for most overseas
Chinese and therefore hold a special attraction for these investors-for many wealthy
overseas Chinese the opportunity to assist in the development of the motherland and
simultaneously obtain a return on their investments holds both a sentimental and a
practical appeal;
(3) The SEZs' proximity to Hong Kong provides investors with easy access to the
zones, and permits the SEZs to tap the infra-structural resources of one of the
world's financial centers;
(4) Locating three SEZs in the Guangdong province may also have been influenced
by political considerations. By developing the Shenzhen SEZ on the opposite side
of the border to The New Territories of Hong Kong, China may accelerate the rate
of economic development on the Chinese side and promote economic integration
between Hong Kong and Guangdong.
Id. at 202.
With two interdependent economies along side each other, China has a formula
for reunification in which Hong Kong might retain its present economic system
within the framework of a "super-SEZ," or at least of erasing the economic boundary
between the two areas and thereby facilitating the reunification process.
Id.
262. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Special Economic Zones in Guang-
dong Province, art. 1, approved by the 15th Session of the Standing Committee of the 5th
National People's Congress, Aug. 26, 1980, reprinted and translated in CmNA LAWS FOR
FOREIGN BusiHmss 70-800 (CCH Australia Ltd. 1987) [hereinafter Guangdong Regulations].
263. Nishitateno, supra note 258, at 176. These areas are similar to the Export Processing
Zones (EPZ) which can be seen in India, Korea, and other developing countries. EPZs are
usually found in countries with undeveloped and weak economies which seek to attract foreign
capital and advanced technology. By providing the land, raw materials, and labor resources
foreign businesses need, EPZs establish a mutually beneficial system for the production of
goods for export. Id. Special Economic Zones differ in that their emphasis is not to attract
export industries exclusively. Id. at 177.
264. HARDING, supra note 13, at 164.
265. Guangdong Regulations, supra note 262, at art. 4.
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all assets, profits, and other legitimate rights and interests will be
legally protected, 26 China will ensure that investors are given favor-
able investment opportunities in stable business environments.
267
Investors are encouraged to open factories, set up enterprises with
their own investments, or undertake joint ventures with Chinese




The SEZ Regulations provide that the "lawful profits" of inves-
tors, as well as the wages and other "legitimate income" of non-
Chinese SEZ personnel, after payment of income tax, may be remitted
out of China in accordance with the stipulations of the foreign
exchange control measures of the SEZs. 269 Investors may open ac-
counts and handle foreign exchange matters in banks registered in
the SEZs. Investors also may apply for insurance through insurance
companies registered within the zones.
270
2. Preferential Tax Incentives
Foreign enterprises are given preferential treatment regarding im-
port duties. Machinery, spare parts, raw materials, vehicles, and
other means of production for the enterprise are exempted from
import duties. 27' Other necessary consumer goods are subject to full
or lower import duties or exempted altogether.
272
The standard tax rate levied on profits and income of the enter-
prises within the SEZs is fifteen percent. 273 Additionally, enterprises
with an investment of U.S. $5 million or more, and those involving
266. See id. at art. 1.
267. Id. at art. 4.
268. Id. at art. I.
269. Id. at art. 15. No comprehensive foreign exchange rules formulated specifically for
the SEZs have yet been announced. The central piece of legislation is the Provisional Regulations
of the People's Republic of China Governing Foreign Exchange Control, issued by the State
Council on December 18, 1980. Currently, this national foreign exchange regulation is being
applied in the zones. However, on November 16, 1985, the Shenzhen government promulgated
the Provisional Measures of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on Foreign Exchange
Adjustment. The objective of these measures is to facilitate currency conversion of renminbi
and foreign currency funds held by enterprises in the zone in accordance with a floating rate
of exchange, and in the process curbing the black market in currency transactions. Pow &
Moser, supra note 261, at 208.
270. Guangdong Regulations, supra note 262, at art. 8.
271. Id. at art. 13.
272. Id. These exemptions depend upon the needs of each enterprise. Id.
273. Id. at art. 14.
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higher technologies or having a lounger cycle of capital turnover, will
receive additional preferential tax treatment.274 Investors who reinvest
their profits in the SEZs for a minimum of five years may apply for
exemption from income taxes on profits from these reinvestments. 275
3. Labor
SEZ labor service companies recommend employees to foreign
enterprises. 276 The investor may, with the consent of the Guangdong
Provincial Administration of Special Economic Zones, 27 7 recruit his
own employees. 278 Investors may employ foreign personnel for tech-
nical and administrative work.279 A foreign enterprise will manage its
employees according to its own business' requirements.
20
The terms of employment, including the scales and forms of wages,
award methods, labor insurance, and various state subsidies, shall
be provided in the employee's labor contract.28' The labor contracts
are between the enterprises and the employees and must conform to
the stipulations of the Guangdong Provincial Administration of Spe-
cial Economic Zones. 282 An enterprise shall stipulate the job require-
ments in the contract and may dismiss an employee according to the
provisions of the employee's contract.283
274. Id.
275. Guangdong Regulations, supra note 262, at art. 16.
276. Id. at art. 19.
277. The Guangdong Provincial Administration of Special Economic Zones regulates the
SEZs within Guangdong. This body is independent of the pre-existing administration in
Guangdong in order that it may deal with the peculiarities of the SEZs. Nishitateno, supra
note 258, at 178. A similar administrative organ exits in Fujian. Id.
These provincial administrations exercise the functions to: (1) draw up plans for the special
zones and organize for their implementation; (2) examine and approve investment projects of
investors in the special zones; (3) deal with registration of industrial and commercial enterprises
in the special zones and with land allotment; (4) coordinate the working relations among the
banking, insurance, taxation, customs, frontier inspection, postal and telecommunications and
other organizations within the zones; (5) provide staff members and workers needed by the
enterprises in the special zones and protect the legitimate rights and interests of these staff
members and workers; (6) run education, cultural, health and other public welfare facilities in
the special zones; (7) maintain law and order in the special zones and protect according to
law the persons and properties in the special zones from encroachment. Guangdong Regulations,
supra note 262, at art. 23.
278. Guangdong Regulations, supra note 262, at art. 19.
279. Id. at art. 10.
280. Id. at art. 20.
281. Id. at art. 21.
282. Id.
283. Id. at art. 20.
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B. Special Economic Zones: The First Ten Years
1. Achievements
Special Economic Zones grant foreign enterprises preferential tax
incentives and permit the necessary flexibility for companies to con-
duct their affairs efficiently. The SEZs replicate the export free
processing zones that have made Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea
the industrial powerhouses of Asia. An examination of Shenzhen,
the largest SEZ, reveals China's successful efforts at modernization.
284
Shenzhen has been established in the Southern coast of China, close
to the Hong Kong border, to enable it to benefit from the foreign
enterprises conducting business in Hong Kong. Because of its isola-
tion, Shenzhen has enjoyed rapid growth in both total output and
foreign investment; 28 1 Hong Kong interests top all others and account
for 80 percent of total foreign investment. 286 By 1985, Shenzhen
already had attracted more than half of the original target established
for foreign investment 2 7 for the zone from 1980 to 2000.288 Almost
overnight, a sleepy town transformed itself into a bustling city, with
high-rise office buildings, fashionable hotels, and wide streets rivaling
those in Hong Kong.289
284. Pow & Moser, supra note 261, at 204. Largely because of its size, comparatively well-
developed infrastructure, and proximity to Hong Kong, Shenzhen has advanced beyond all the
other SEZs. To date, Shenzhen has attracted the bulk of direct foreign investment in the
SEZs. By the end of 1984, more than 3000 agreements had been signed with foreign investors
committing H.K. $15 billion, the equivalent of U.S. $1.9 billion. Id.
285. HARDiLG, supra note 13, at 165.
286. Pow & Moser, supra note 261, at 204.
287. HARiNG, supra note 13, at 165. Within five years of its creation, Shenzhen had
attracted U.S. $840 million in direct foreign investment-one seventh of the national total and
more than half the zone's original target for foreign investment. Id.
288. Id. See Pow & Moser, supra note 261, at 204, stating;
While the other zones are beginning to intensify their attempts to attract investment,
Shenzhen has unveiled a detailed long-range development plan which calls for exports
to reach U.S. $5.2 billion per annum by 1990, and annual industrial output to reach
U.S. $7.1 billion by 2000. The draft plan, announced in September 1982, outlines a
number of development projects in the areas of light industry, agriculture, tourism,
and transportation, and anticipates that before the end of the century foreign
investment in these projects will exceed U.S. $7.2 billion. Under the plan, it is
expected that by the year 2000 there will be 1,500 enterprises employing more than
400,000 workers, but by the end of 1985 Shenzhen's population already had reached
400,000 and the zone had more than 750 industrial enterprises.
Id.
289. HARWiNo, supra note 13, at 165. The changes make China unrecognizable to those
who last visited the country before 1976. Youths wear blue jeans and T-shirts like their
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2. Costs
Shenzhen's accomplishments have not been achieved without con-
siderable social and economic costs. The Shenzhen SEZ places a
greater burden on the central treasury-in investments made and
taxes forgiven-than originally anticipated.290 Shenzhen has attracted
fewer "high tech" industries29' and generated less foreign exchange
than the government had projected. 29 Further, both Hong Kong's
currency293 and culture 94 have replaced those indigenous to Shenzhen.
C. Hong Kong's Role in China's International Economic
Expansion
China's resurgence in the international marketplace, particularly
through the SEZs, has allowed Hong Kong's exports and re-exports
to China to soar. Within the last fifteen years, Hong Kong has
counterparts in East Asia. Women again are wearing the cheongsam that was commonplace
before the communist takeover. Disco music blares from radios and television antennas that
sprout from urban apartment complexes and suburban homes. Enthusiastic audiences gather
to watch Western films ranging from The Turning Point to Rambo. Throngs of foreign tourists
patronize China's new and modern hotels managed by Sheraton and Holiday Inn, and eat at
restaurants catered by Maxim's of Paris and Hong Kong's most successful restauranteurs. Id.
at 1.
290. Id. at 165-66. Originally, in 1982, a 20 year development plan called for an expenditure
of 3.7 billion yuan in capital construction. However, the entire amount was spent within the
first two years, and the projected investment was increased to 7.5 billion yuan for the next
five years. In all, Shenzhen required more than twice the investment initially forecast for 20
years. Id.
291. See Pow & Moser, supra note 261, at 204. In earlier years, more than half of the
total investment projects in Shenzhen involved light industrial and small-scale processing and
assembly operations. Shenzhen is beginning to attract more large-scale industrial investments.
Id.
292. HARDING, supra note 13, at 166. Shenzhen developed into more of an import-
procurement zone than the export processing zone it was designed to be. Instead of exporting
goods, China has consumed more than two-thirds of Shenzhen's output. Id.
293. Id. Within the last few years, debate has centered over whether the SEZs should have
their own currency. Presently, Shenzhen has three currencies in circulation: renminbi, foreign
exchange certificates, and Hong Kong dollars. Prices of goods and services vary in accordance
to the type of currency offered for payment. The currency most in demand is the Hong Kong
dollar, and it has become the prevalent currency within the Shenzhen SEZ because it assures
foreign entrepreneurs and local workers of total convertibility. Id.
294. Id. One senior leader who visited Shenzhen noted that the SEZ had turned completely
capitalistic. Id. at 168. Tipping, prostitution, smuggling, and corruption have become flagrant
in Shenzhen and are growing concerns for Chinese officials. Id. at 166. In the late autumn of
1982, posters went up around Shenzhen announcing that the Triad Societies-14K, the Wo
sihing Wo, and the Shui Fong-from Hong Kong were infiltrating Shenzhen to "smuggle and
peddle drugs, get people to flee abroad, lure innocent girls into prostitution, commit assault
and robbery and carry out all kinds of outrages to disrupt public order." Wren, China Attracts
Hong Kong's Money, and Gangsters, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1983, at A2, col. 3.
1990 / Hong Kong: Prospects of Autonomy under Chinese Rule
played an increasing role as the major entrepot through which China
and its SEZs sold exports and procured imports. 295 Within this period,
China assumed a greater share of Hong Kong's trade. 296 Traditionally,
China has maintained a large balance of payments surplus with Hong
Kong. 2 7 But China's increasing trade with Hong Kong dramatically
reduced this surplus from $3.2 billion in 1982 to $2.1 billion in
1984.298 The growth in commercial activities between the two countries
demonstrates a developing symbiosis between the two economies. 29
D. Prospects for the Special Economic Zones
Although the problems with the SEZs have drawn harsh criticism
from the conservative members of the Chinese Communist Party,3°°
the SEZs have been permitted to continue. Supporters argue that
Shenzhen's development should be viewed as a staged process in
which results are gradually achieved. 01 Others argue that Shenzhen
should not limit its economy exclusively to foreign markets; they
encourage Shenzhen to open itself to "both the outside world and
295. HARDING, supra note 13, at 145. Hong Kong's share of Chinese trade rose from 11%
in 1978 to 22% percent in the mid-1980s. Between 1974 and 1984, China doubled its share of
Hong Kong's trade from 9% to 18%. Hicks, supra note 199, at 51.
296. Hicks, supra note 199, at 51. In 1984, 27% of Chinese exports went to Hong Kong,
up from a negligible amount in 1979. Id.
297. Although no official balance of payments data exists for either the People's Republic
of China or Hong Kong, trade statistics reveal that since 1952, the balance always has been
unfavorable to Hong Kong. China's trade surplus with Hong Kong in the 1950s, totaled U.S.
$772,830,000. The Chinese trade surplus with Hong Kong in the 1960s grew 314% to U.S.
$3,202,830,000, and again grew 315% to U.S. $13,319,950,000 in the 1970s. Jao, Hong Kong's
Role in Financing China's Modernization, in CNA AND HoNG KoNG: Tan EcoNoc NExus
17 (A. Youngson ed. 1983) [hereinafter Jao, Financing China's Modernization].
298. Hicks, supra note 199, at 51-52.
299. While trade statistics illustrate one face of a growing interdependence between Hong
Kong and China, the colony plays a greater role in helping China reach its goals of
modernization. Since Hong Kong is the world's third largest banking center, and a major
tourist center in the Far East, it is an important source of foreign exchange and a source for
both short and long-term loans for China. See generally Jao, Financing China's Modernization,
supra note 296, at 24-44 (discussing the various means by which Hong Kong provides China
with foreign exchange - banking, remittances and other unrequited transfers, and tourism
and travel expenditures). Further, Hong Kong entrepreneurs are exceptionally responsive to
incentives and, given the right investment climate, are more willing to invest in favorable
business environments. Beginning in 1977, Hong Kong residents have pledged more than U.S.
$2 billion in investments in China's Special Economic Zones, more than that from any other
country. Id. at 44-60.
300. See HARDING, supra note 13, at 168. The criticisms involved political and symbolic
issues. One senior leader who visited Shenzhen was quoted in the Chinese Press, "apart from
the five starred red flag, everything in Shenzhen has turned capitalistic." Another leader
reportedly burst into tears during an inspection tour, declaring he would never have joined
the Communist Party had he known Shenzhen would be the result. Id.
301. Id. at 169.
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the areas at home, ' 30 2 and to draw and sell capital along broader
horizons. 33 In a much publicized statement supporting the Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone, Deng Xiaoping stated that Shenzhen was
still in an experimental stage and that the Zone represented the
correct approach to China's foreign economic relations.: 4 In early
1986, Chinese leaders agreed to allow a grace period for the SEZ,
to significantly improve its foreign exchange and capital accounts. 5
Despite the grace period, the SEZs will probably survive their present
difficulties, if only because disbanding them would greatly damage
China's longer term goals concerning Hong Kong.3 6
X. THE LIKELIHOOD THAT CHINA WILL UPHOLD THE JOINT
DECLARATION
Hong Kong's role in China's economic development guarantees
China will uphold the spirit of the Declaration. During the past
decade, China pursued a bold new venture for modernizing its
economy and continues to trade actively at the international level.
Since Hong Kong is the primary entrepot through which China
conducts this trade, China's potential for growth is dependent upon
the Colony's continued health and vigor. China must ensure Hong
Kong's economic and political stability in order to achieve its own
economic goals.
Evidence suggests that throughout the 1980s, China has been
concerned with Hong Kong's stability and future economy. In 1982,
when Hong Kong's economy stumbled because of the deteriorating
confidence over the Colony's future, China took immediate action
to prevent financial disaster. The Chinese government made sizeable
investments in all sectors of Hong Kong's economy,3° while domestic
302. See id. (quoting an official of the provincial economic system reform commission in
Guangdong).
303. Id.
304. Id. China consistently has emphasized that its economic policies are not transitory.
See Wren, China Vows to Honor Hong Kong Pact, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1984, at A3, col. 4.
Deng Xiaoping, referring to China's economic modernization, stated, "Our policy will not
change and no one can change it because the policy is correct and effective." Id.
305. HARDING, supra note 13, at 169. Some reports suggest that Shenzhen was told to
increase the share of total output that it exported from 40% in 1985, to 6056 in 1990, reduce
transshipment of foreign goods to other provinces, and cut back on imports of foreign
components. Id.
306. Id.
307. See Jao, Free Market Economy, supra note 64, at 213. According to Wang Kuang-
ying, Chairman of the Beijing-owned Everbright Industrial Corporation, China had, by early
1984, invested some U.S. $4 million in more than 300 Hong Kong projects through 50
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financial institutions lent money to their counterparts in Hong Kong.3 s
Two years later, the Government took over two large Hong Kong
industrial firms in order to avert their bankruptcy. The following
year, the Bank of China financially supported the Kah Wah Bank
when it suffered a run.3°9 Although self-interest may partially explain
these actions, they do demonstrate a legitimate interest in Hong
Kong, an interest China is unlikely to abandon by renouncing the
Declaration.
A breach of the Declaration would unravel the developing economic
relationship between Hong Kong and China and undermine maiy
advantages an autonomous and prosperous Hong Kong could confer
on China. As a valuable entrepot for the Chinese, Hong Kong
provides a wealth of opportunities for local Chinese industries, 310
particularly those within Shenzhen. A breach of the Declaration
would adversely impact China's domestic economy and restrict access
to the vital resources that China needs to realize its own economic
aspirations.31 1 Because Hong Kong is an international financial center,
a breach would anger many countries which have made sizeable
investments in Hong Kong's economy.312 If these countries were to
withdraw those funds and remove their citizens from Hong Kong,
representative and trade offices. Id. The Industry Department of the Hong Kong Government
estimates that at the end of March 1985, Beijing owned or controlled 124 firms in trade and
industrial promotion, 44 in banking and finance, five in insurance, 19 in manufacturing, four
in publishing and printing, 53 in transportation and tourism, and 26 in real estate and
construction. Id.
308. Id. at 212-13. Between 1979-1981, Hong Kong's financial institutions as a whole were
net lenders to their Chinese counterparts, a position consistent with Hong Kong's status as a
financial center in the Pacific. But from the first quarter of 1982 through the second quarter
of 1985, Hong Kong's financial institutions became net debtors. In 1984 Hong Kong's net
indebtedness to China reached a peak of H.K. $13,784 million, the equivalent of U.S. $1,758
million. However, after the Declaration was signed in the fall of 1984 and local confidence
was restored, Hong Kong once again became net lenders to China. Id.
309. Id. In December 1985, the Hwa Jian Company, a state-run enterprise under the State
Council's Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, took a substantial equity interest in Kah Wah Bank
through a joint venture with Singapore interests. Id.
310. See Corwin, supra note 5, at 520.
311. Harding, The Future of Hong Kong, supra note 234, at 33. Hong Kong provides
China with a valuable source of hard currency, investment capital, managerial, financial, and
technological expertise that China seriously lacks for its modernization. In recent years, China
has sent study groups to Hong Kong to learn these skills and implement them in the Chinese
economic structure. Id.
312. Prybyla, supra note 60, at 171. Almost half of all foreign investment in Hong Kong
is American. Id. at 173. Japan is second, with about 25%; Britain is a distant third, with six
percent. Id. Despite recurrent jitters, capitalist investors, especially Americans, keep coming
into Hong Kong. However, most investments in Hong Kong, domestic as well as foreign, are
relatively short-term in nature. Id. at 171. They can be recouped within five years or less,
with handsome profits into the bargain. "Almost everybody agrees that there is that much
time, perhaps more, before the shadow of 1997 casts a pall." Id.
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the exodus of capital and human resources would greatly diminish
Hong Kong's value to China. 313 As the leading source of foreign
exchange, an unexcelled financial center, entrepot, and information
center, Hong Kong has become an invaluable asset to the Chinese.
31 4
If Beijing upholds the spirit of the Declaration, it will inherit Hong
Kong's first-rate services and state of the art facilities from Britain
3
11




As July 1, 1997 approaches, anxious investors must decide whether
to remain in Hong Kong or to abandon the Colony altogether. Hong
Kong's future autonomy lies in the hands of its residents who invest
their skill and capital in the Colony's miracle economy. These resi-
dents share a grave concern over Hong Kong's future, and their
emigration substantially devalues the Colony to the Chinese. The
concerns over Hong Kong's future cannot be lightly set aside and
China has boldly addressed them.
The Chinese wish to preserve Hong Kong's autonomy and pros-
perity. By drafting the Sino-British Joint Declaration and making
sizeable investments in the Colony, China hopes to bolster investor
confidence in Hong Kong and retain the Colony's status quo. Ad-
ditionally, by decentralizing administrative control over its own econ-
omy, China is narrowing the disparity between Chinese socialist
modernization and Hong Kong's laissez-faire capitalism. China's
domestic reforms reinvigorate its private economy and alleviate some
of Hong Kong's fears over reunification.
Hong Kong's future is brighter in light of China's development of
Special Economic Zones, areas where foreign investors are welcome
to exert their capitalist influence. Within a period of five years,
Shenzhen SEZ, which borders Hong Kong, has transformed itself
from a quiet town into a bustling city. Although Shenzhen has
313. Corwin, supra note 5, at 521-22.
314. Jao, Free Market Economy, supra note 64, at 213.
315. Fishburne, supra note 67, at 44. Hong Kong serves as a business and financial center
in part because of its strong existing infrastructure. Many office buildings exist and more are
being built. Acceptable expatriate housing is in place. Hong Kong has a communications
network that is second to none. World class hotels are available for business travellers. State
of the art communications, data processing, and related equipment and services from across
the world are available in Hong Kong. This infrastructure will remain after 1997. Id.
316. Jao, Free Market Economy, supra note 64, at 215.
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strained the national treasury and tainted Chinese culture, the city
has made substantial advances in attracting foreign investments and
foreign exchange. Most importantly, Shenzhen has lured many Hong
Kong businesses and has become a fertile economic laboratory for
screening Hong Kong's entrepreneurial practices. By studying the
successful business practices of foreign ventures within the SEZs,
China hopes to educate domestic enterprises and improve the main-
land's economy. Continued development of the SEZs will narrow
the standard of living separating China and Hong Kong, assure Hong
Kong a high degree of autonomy, and give the Colony hope for a
prosperous future.
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